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And in the naked light I saw, ten thousand people, maybe more, people
talking without speaking, people hearing without listening, people writing
songs that voices never share, and no one dared disturb the sound of
silence.'
I. Introduction
"Homeownership is the American dream. It is the opportunity for all
Americans to put down roots and start creating equity for themselves and their
families."2 To realize this dream, most Americans go through the sometimes
1. SIMON & GARFUNKEL, The Sound of Silence, on SOUNDS OF SILENCE (Columbia
Records 1965).
2. Predatory Mortgage Lending: The Problem, Impact, andResponse: Hearing Before
the U.S. S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 1-2 (2001) [hereinafter
Predatory Mortgage Lending] (opening statement of Senator Paul S. Sarbanes, Chairman, S.
Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs); see also Anne-Marie Motto, Note, Skirting
the Law: How Predatory Mortgage Lenders are Destroying the American Dream, 18 GA. ST.
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gut-wrenching experience of signing their lives away in exchange for a
mortgage loan. They contract with mortgage lenders to pay back a huge
amount of principal plus hundreds of thousands of dollars in interest typically
over ten, fifteen, twenty, or thirty years. Unfortunately, predatory mortgage
lenders often make financing a home even more expensive by employing
unscrupulous tactics4 in order to profit at their borrowers' expense.5
In one such case of predatory lending, a mortgage borrower's lender6
notified him, without explanation, that the amount of money he had to send on
top of his monthly mortgage payment to cover property taxes and home
owner's insurance was increasing by over $60 per month. 7 It turns out that his
lender had been "overcharging his escrow account,8 building up a fat cushion of
[his and other] borrowers' money, and investing the 'float' to [make] some
profit."9 In another case nearby, a similarly situated borrower had to fight with
U. L. REv. 859, 859-63 (2002) (examining abusive practices of predatory lenders and
concluding that "current federal and state law provides insufficient protection against predatory
lending, and that... state and local efforts to halt abusive lending practices have fallen short
when met with resistance from a wealthy and powerful mortgage lobby").
3. See, e.g., All Business, Choosing a Mortgage Loan, http://www.allbusiness.
com/personal-finance/real-estate-mortgage-loans/3379-1.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2007)
(discussing various mortgage loan options) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
4. See Jessica Fogel, Comment, State Consumer Protection Statutes: An Alternative
Approach to Solving the Problem of Predatory Mortgage Lending, 28 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 435,
435 (2005) ("[T]here are a number of predatory.., lenders who abuse their positions of trust
and superior bargaining position.").
5. See Predatory Mortgage Lending, supra note 2, at 1-2 ("Predatory lenders play on
[American] hopes and dreams to cynically cheat people of their wealth.").
6. Importantly, this Note does not distinguish between lenders and loan servicers. It uses
the generic term "lender" to refer to any financial institution that creates or services mortgage
loans.
7. See Iver Peterson, Padding in the Escrow Cushion, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1991, § 10,
at 1 ("A letter familiar to many home mortgage borrowers came to James Cunningham...
notifying him that the amount of his monthly mortgage payment his lender put aside to pay taxes
and insurance was being increased, from $292 to $354 a month.").
8. See BLACK'S LAW DIcTIoNA tY 19 (8th ed. 2004) (defining an escrow account as "[a]
bank account, generally held in the name of the depositor and an escrow agent, that is returnable
to the depositor or paid to a third person on the fulfillment of specified conditions"); see also
Edwin C. Mills, The Functioning and Regulation of Escrow Accounts, in 5 HOUSING POLICY
DEBATE 204 (Fannie Mae ed., 1994) ("An escrow account consists of funds held by a third
party, who collects, holds, and disburses the funds pursuant to a contract or an obligation
between two parties. An escrow account for a home mortgage is held by the organization that
services the mortgage."); Thomas H. Broadt, Comment, TheAttack Upon the Tax andInsurance
Escrow Accounts in Mortgages, 47 TEMP. L.Q. 352, 352 (1974) (explaining that escrow
accounts first appeared in the 1930s at a time when widespread poverty and insolvency led
thousands of American banks to adopt similar protections).
9. Peterson, supra note 7, at 1.
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his bank for the same reason.' 0 His escrow account was supposed to dip to a
little over $1,300 each year, but his lender never let it drop below $2,600."
Although this borrower did care about the money, he fought mostly as "a matter
of principle."' 2 Elsewhere, another borrower assumed that his lender would
reimburse him at the end of the year for paying an overage of $800 into his
escrow account. 13 To his surprise, his lender instead required him "to pump"
another $900 into his escrow account. 14 Baffled, he phoned his lender for an
explanation.' 5 When this borrower continued to "balk[] at paying the
surcharge," his lender threatened him with foreclosure.'
6
The lenders in each of these factual scenarios allegedly violated Section
10(a) 17 of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) 18 by
overcharging their borrowers' escrow accounts to cover taxes and insurance.
Lenders that violate Section 10(a) often take advantage of this illegal escrow
"cushion" by using it for their own investment purposes. 19 One might assume,
and justifiably so, that victims such as those in the three examples above could
sue for damages. RESPA, however, says nothing about enforcement of Section
10. Id.
11. See id. (reporting that "the balance of [Mr. Comins'] escrow account should dip to at
least $1,383.33 for one month of the year," but it never drops below "$2,600").
12. Id.
13. See David W. Myers, Impounding Accounts: Convenience or Curse?, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 15, 1992, Real Estate Section, at 1 (reporting that even though David Brown paid $4,800
annually for taxes and insurance, when only $4,000 would actually come due, his lender "had




17. See 12 U.S.C. § 2609(a) (2000) (limiting the amount lenders may hold in escrow
accounts to cover taxes and insurance premiums). This Note refers to § 2609, generally, as
Section 10. It refers to § 2609(a), specifically, as Section 10(a). In 1990, when Congress
amended Section 10, it designated the existing text as Section 10(a) and added subsections (b)
through (d). See infra note 20 (referring to the 1990 amendments).
18. See id. §§ 2601-10, 2614-17 (establishing protective measures against predatory
lending).
19. See infra notes 42-62 and accompanying text (discussing the unfairness of investing
borrowers' escrow funds). Lenders have long taken advantage of escrow accounts for
investment purposes. See, e.g., Broadt, supra note 8, at 352 (stating that lending associations
"invest the [escrow funds] in short-term loans," and "do not pay the depositor interest for the use
of the funds"); Charles A. Pillsbury, Note, Lender Accountability and the Problem of
Noninterest-Bearing Mortgage Escrow Accounts, 54 B.U. L. REV. 516, 516 (1974) (referring to
allegations that escrow accounts "provide lenders with additional income that does not rightfully
belong to them").
1162
TACKLING THE PERPLEXING SOUND OF STATUTORY SILENCE 1163
10(a),2 0 and most federal courts refuse to imply a private right of action under
this provision.2'
Courts that refuse to find an implied private right of action under Section
10(a) typically do so because Congress has not expressly created one. 2 This
common conclusion is suspect because Congress designed RESPA to protect
mortgage consumers and stifle predatory mortgage lending.23 Without a private
right of action under Section 10(a), this provision fails to protect borrowers
and, in fact, invites lenders to employ predatory lending practices by allowing
them to continue to overcharge their borrowers' escrow accounts.
This Note attempts to refute the prevailing argument that no private right
of action exists under Section 10(a) of RESPA by "disturb[ing] the sound of
silence ',24 and asserting that Congress intended to create an implied private
right of action for violations of Section 10(a). Part II introduces RESPA
generally, introduces Section 10(a) of RESPA in particular, and establishes that
violations of Section 10(a) thwart RESPA's purposes and contribute greatly to
the problem of predatory lending. Part III lays the groundwork for
determining whether courts should imply a private right of action under Section
20. See 12 U.S.C. at § 2609(d) (providing penalties for violations of subsection (c), which
regulates escrow account statements, but not for violations of subsections (a) or (b)). Prior to
the 1990 amendments, Section 10 did not have subsections (b) through (d). See Cranston-
Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 101-625, 104 Stat. 4079 (Nov. 28,
1990) (amending Section 10 of RESPA by designating the existing text as subsection (a) and
adding subsections (b) through (d)).
21. See, e.g., Hardy v. Regions Mortgage, Inc., 449 F.3d 1357, 1359-60 (1 th Cir. 2006)
(holding that no private right of action exists for violations of Section 10); Clayton v. Raleigh
Fed. Sav. Bank, 107 F.3d 865, 1997 WL 82624, at *1 (4th Cir. 1997) (affirming, without
opinion, a district court holding that no private right of action exists under Section 10);
Louisiana v. Litton Mortgage Co., 50 F.3d 1298, 1301-02 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that no
private right of action exists under Section 10); Allison v. Liberty Say., 695 F.2d 1086, 1091
(7th Cir. 1982) (same); McAnaney v. Astoria Fin. Corp., 357 F. Supp. 2d 578, 591 (E.D.N.Y.
2005) (same); Byrd v. Homecomings Fin. Network, 407 F. Supp. 2d 937,945 (N.D. I11. 2005)
(same); see also Michael G. Walsh, Annotation, Construction and Application of Real Estate
Settlement Procedures Act of 1974, 142 A.L.R. FED. 511, § 8 (a)-(b) (1997) (comparing cases
that held that a private right of action exists under Section 10 with cases that held the opposite
through 1997).
22. See infra notes 189-203 and accompanying text (discussing cases that have refused to
find an implied private right of action under Section 10).
23. See infra notes 36-41 and accompanying text (discussing the purposes of RESPA's
enactment).
24. SIMON & GARFuNKEL, supra note 1 and accompanying text (citing Simon and
Garfunkel's "The Sound of Silence").
25. See infra Part II (demonstrating the need for implying a private right of action under
Section 10(a) of RESPA).
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10(a).26 It details general approaches to statutory construction, delves into
Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding implied private rights of action, and
emphasizes that courts have an obligation to save and not to destroy statutory
text.27 Part IV analyzes and critiques cases that have decided the issue of
whether a private right of action exists under Section 10 generally.28 It then
applies the proper standard of construction to Section 10(a) and argues that
Congress intended to create an implied private right of action under this
provision.29 Finally, Part V concludes that, under the law currently in effect,
federal courts should imply a private right of action under Section 10(a)
because this provision falls within the limited category of cases in which courts
may find such an implied right.
II. Demonstrating the Need for Implying a Private Right ofAction
Under Section 1 O(a)
Chief Justice Marshall once declared that "the very essence of civil liberty
certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the
laws, whenever he receives an injury."30 The Supreme Court has since rejected
a permissive implication doctrine that would imply whatever rights are
necessary to make effective congressional purposes31 for a doctrine of statutory
construction that focuses on legislative intent.32 Nevertheless, congressional
purposes remain highly relevant and are, in fact, essential to the question of
intent.33 In other words, congressional purposes do not control the analysis, but
26. See infra Part III (establishing the standard of interpretation that applies to Section
10(a)'s silence).
27. See infra Part III (focusing on general approaches to statutory constitution, Supreme
Court jurisprudence, and the obligation of courts to save and not destroy statutory text).
28. See infra Part IV.A (discussing cases that have decided for and against implying a
private right of action under Section 10(a) of RESPA).
29. See infra Part IV.B (applying the appropriate test to the question of whether a private
right of action exists under Section 10(a) of RESPA).
30. Marburyv. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
31. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (rejecting the Supreme Court's long-standing
permissive implication doctrine).
32. See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 287 (2001) (reaffirming Cort's
rejection of the "ancien regime" which provided whatever remedies were necessary to effectuate
the purposes of a statute); Cort, 422 U.S. at 78 (abandoning the understanding that the courts
have a duty to provide whatever remedies are necessary to effectuate the purposes of a statute).
33. See infra Part II.A (providing the purposes of RESPA and Section 10(a)); Part II.B
(asserting that violations of Section 10(a) thwart RESPA's purposes); Part III.A (emphasizing
the relevance of statutory purposes when interpreting a statute).
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they continue to offer strong evidence of legislative intent. The purposes of
RESPA strongly indicate that denying mortgage consumers a private right of
action under Section 10(a) cuts contrary to congressional intent in passing this
provision.34 Furthermore, failure to recognize a private right of action under
Section 10(a) of RESPA renders the language of this provision superfluous-a
result which the Supreme Court seeks to avoid at all costs.35
A. The Purposes of RESPA and Section 10(a)
Congress passed RESPA in response to the 1970s consumer protection
movement to regulate mortgage lending.36 The statute "respon[ded] to...
abuses in the real estate settlement process" and aimed to "protect consumers
from... unnecessarily high settlement charges."3 7 Congress, in short, created
RESPA to protect mortgage consumers and stifle predatory mortgage lending.
By its own terms, RESPA purports to effectuate "changes in the settlement
process for residential real estate that will result... in a reduction in the
amounts home buyers are required to place in escrow accounts established to
insure the payment of real estate taxes and insurance . ,,38 Congress,
therefore, designed Section 10-now Section 10(a) 39-for the purpose of
limiting the amount lenders may require borrowers to deposit in escrow
accounts. 4° Congress, in this way, "attacked" and "outlawed... maintaining an
34. See infra Part II.A (providing statutory purposes that are inconsistent with a
congressional intent not to imply a private right of action under Section 10(a) of RESPA).
35. See infra notes 286-93 and accompanying text (arguing that to find no private right of
action under Section 10(a) renders the provision unnecessary).
36. See 12 U.S.C. § 2601(a) (2000) ("Significant reforms in the real estate settlement
process are needed."); Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 95-533, 88
Stat. 1724 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-17) (creating RESPA); Dale A.
Whitman, The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act: How to Comply-Problems and
Prospects, 4 REAL EST. L.J. 223, 223-25 (1976) (explaining that Congress's first response to
consumer rights advocates was to direct the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) and the Veterans' Administration (VA) to study the problem of excess settlement costs);
id. at 224-25 (reporting that Congress enacted RESPA on the basis of findings from the VA
study); see also The Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-351, 84 Stat. 461
(aiming to increase the availability of mortgage credit to finance "urgently needed housing").
37. See 12 U.S.C. § 2601(a) (stating that one of RESPA's purposes is to "insure that
consumers throughout the [n]ation... are protected from unnecessarily high settlement
charges"); see also Charles G. Field, RESPA in a Nutshell, 11 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. L.J.
447, 448-49 (1976) (stating that by passing RESPA Congress intended to eliminate mortgage
lenders' abusive practices).
38. 12 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1H4).
39. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (introducing Section 10(a) of RESPA).
40. Subsection (a) of Section 10 limits the size of escrow accounts lenders may establish
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overlarge 'cushion' of borrowers' tax and insurance premiums to profit from
the interest gained by investing it."'
B. Violations of Section 10(a) Thwart RESPA's Purposes and Contribute
to the Problem of Predatory Lending
Despite RESPA's supposedly "extensive" protections 42 and the ability of
mortgage borrowers to fall back on state consumer protection statutes, 43 the law
currently fails to protect mortgage consumers. 44 Violations of Section 10(a), in
particular, contribute to a rampant predatory lending problem that has a
tremendously adverse effect on consumers. Lenders that overcharge their
borrowers' escrow accounts in violation of Section 10(a) profit illicitly at their
to pay taxes and insurance premiums. 12 U.S.C. § 2609(a). Subsection (b) requires lenders to
provide timely notice to borrowers of shortages in escrow accounts. Id. § 2609(b). Subsection
(c) requires lenders to provide borrowers with a statement that outlines the estimated taxes,
insurance premiums, and other charges that will come due during the first twelve months after
establishing the escrow account. Id. § 2609(c). Subsection (d) authorizes the Secretary of HUD
to assess penalties for violations of subsection (c). Id. § 2609(d).
41. Peterson, supra note 7, at 1.
42. See Mary S. Robertson, The "New and Improved" Real Estate Settlement Procedures
Act andRegulationX, 47 CONSUMER FN. L.Q. REP. 273,273 (1993) (highlighting the evolution
of RESPA "into what is today a comprehensive law that covers virtually every loan secured by
residential real property"). RESPA provides at least some general protection through
administrative enforcement. See 24 C.F.R. § 3500.17(m), (n) (2000) (detailing administrative
remedies for violations of Section 10(c)). State attorneys general similarly provide some general
protection. See infra note 192 and accompanying text (discussing the authority of the state to
sue on behalf of its citizens).
43. See Birkholm v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 447 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1163 (W.D. Wash. 2006)
(stating that "a plaintiff may plead state claims related to misapplication of funds allegedly held
in an escrow account"). Federal courts also recognize that RESPA violations amount to unfair
and deceptive practices for purposes of meeting the "unfair and deceptive act or practice"
element of certain state consumer protection statutes. See, e.g., Brazier v. Sec. Pac. Mortgage,
245 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1142 (W.D. Wash. 2003) (stating that the "failure to make timely
disclosures under... RESPA constitutes an unfair or deceptive act or practice in violation of
the Washington Consumer Protection Act").
44. See Fogel, supra note 4, at 436 ("[F]ederal and state regulations have consistently
failed to adequately protect borrowers from predatory lenders."); see also Marsha L. Williams,
Update on RESPA Issues and Developments, 56 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 4, 9-15 (2002)
(reviewing recent litigation stemming from "improper disclosures.., deceptive trade
practices... [and] the maintenance of escrow accounts"); Kevin J. Skehan, Note, Enforcement
of the Federal Limitation Requirement on Advance Deposits in Escrow Accounts and the
Potential Impact on Mortgage Lenders in Connecticut, 12 BRIDGEPORT L. REv. 789, 790 (1992)
(stating that federal and state regulations limiting escrow account requirements have not
"resulted in the protection of consumers in the mortgage lending industry" because of"federal
loopholes" and an "increase in predatory lending practices").
1166
TACKLING THE PERPLEXING SOUND OF STATUTORY SILENCE 1167
borrowers' expense by investing the excess funds. 45 Due to the failure of many
courts to recognize an implied right of action under Section 10(a), RESPA
offers virtually no protection to individual borrowers against this practice. 6
Considering this lack of protection, it is no surprise that predatory lenders
continue to require borrowers to deposit more into escrow accounts than
Section 10(a) allows.
47
With unrestricted access to mass stores of escrow funds, lenders have
billions of virtually free dollars at their fingertips. 4 8 In fact, in the mid-nineties,
an estimated $5-$ 10 billion were illegally held in escrow accounts.49 By way
of example, a mortgage lender that services 500,000 loans with an average
escrow balance of $750 will earn well over $22 million annually at a
conservative 6% rate of return. 50 Clearly, by overcharging and investing
unsuspecting borrowers' escrow funds, lenders can profit considerably.
Consumer protection groups have long expressed concern over this
practice. 5' They continue to insist that by investing escrow funds, "[b]anks are
45. See infra notes 48-54 and accompanying text (discussing the unfair practice of
investing effectively stolen funds).
46. See, e.g., Scott A. Meacham, Comment, Consumer Credit Legislation and the
Banking Industry, 40 OKLA. L. REv. 645, 667-68 (1987) (commenting that despite imposing
"certain requirements with respect to residential acquisition lending," RESPA "does not
[expressly] impose liability for anything other than kickbacks and referral fees").
47. See, e.g., Johnson v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 216 Fed. App'x 64, 65 (2d Cir. 2007)
(avoiding the issue of whether a private right of action exists under Section 10(a) in a suit
alleging escrow account overcharges); Hardy v. Regions Mortgage, Inc., 449 F.3d 1357, 1359-
60 (11 th Cir. 2006) (refusing to find a private right of action in a suit alleging escrow account
overcharges); Skehan, supra note 44, at 789-90 (reporting on findings that federal and state
regulations fail to protect borrowers from predatory lenders requiring advance payments to
escrow accounts in excess of RESPA's legal limit (citing ATTORNEYS GENERAL OF CALIFORNIA,
FLORIDA, IOWA, MASSACHUSETTS, MINNESOTA, NEW YORK, TEXAS, OVERCHARGING ON
MORTGAGES: VIOLATIONS OF EscRow AccouNT LIMITS BY THE MORTGAGE LENDING INDUSTRY
(Apr. 24, 1990)).
48. See Mills, supra note 8, at 203 (stating that "[e]scrow accounts are the stepchildren of
the mortgage business," and "billions of dollars are invested in escrow balances"); see also id.
(stating that as of 1994, "[a]bout 40 million Americans [had] mortgages serviced by escrow
accounts").
49. See Denene Miller, Mortgage Firm Settles with 26 States for $150 Million,
ALBUQUERQUE J., Feb. 8, 1993, at C5 (reporting that New York Attorney General Robert
Abrams "estimated that between $5 billion and $10 billion in illegal escrow fund[s] are paid to
mortgage lenders nationwide").
50. See Convenience or Curse, supra note 13, at 1 ("A large company that processes
500,000 loans with an average impound balance of $750 each could easily earn more than $10
million a year by investing the money that its borrowers have deposited in their escrow
accounts."). This example reflects a mere 2.6% return. The example cited in the text reflects a
more likely return.
51. See Broadt, supra note 8, at 352 (acknowledging a "growing concern among
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taking interest that rightfully belongs to their borrowers. ''52 The efforts of these
consumer protection groups, however, seem to accomplish little. The common
practice of profiting by overcharging and investing escrow funds stretches back
to RESPA's beginning5
3 and it continues to flourish.
54
Overcharging escrow accounts contributes to the soaring foreclosure rates
that result from predatory mortgage lending.55 Lenders can threaten borrowers
with foreclosure if they balk at paying escrow surcharges. 56 To make matters
worse, the homeowners who have "billions of dollars socked away in these
[escrow] accounts" seem to have nowhere to turn for redress. 57 According to
former New York Attorney General, Robert Abrams, "[t]his is a conscious,
concerted action taken by an entire industry to rip off the public and get free
loans at its expense.
58
Notably, coalitions of state attorneys general have successfully won
settlements worth hundreds of millions of dollars against lenders for violations
of Section 10(a),59 but they lack the necessary time and resources "to battle
several [lending] institutions at once." 60 Consequently, lenders can get away
with stealing their borrowers' money with little risk. Some states do require
consumer protection groups" regarding lenders' investment of escrow account funds).
52. See Myers, supra note 13, at I ("Consumer groups say that it's unfair for lenders to
use their borrowers' money to earn interest for themselves.").
53. See Pillsbury, supra note 19, at 518 (examining "borrowers' suits to compel lenders to
account.., for profits earned through the investment of escrow funds").
54. See supra note 47 and accompanying text (illustrating the current extent of escrow
overcharging); see also James T. Walter & Grace Sterrett, Housing Finance: Major
Developments in 1991, 47 Bus. LAW. 1219, 1226 (1992) (reporting that the maintenance of
unreasonably large escrow account balances, one of RESPA's targeted abuses, continues to
flourish).
55. See Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and
Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEx. L. REv. 1255, 1257 (2002) ("[P]redatory lending-
exploitative high-cost loans to naive borrowers-. . . has sent foreclosure rates soaring.").
56. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (providing an example of a case in which
the borrower's lender threatened him with foreclosure for balking at paying surcharges).
Notably, government authorities may threaten homeowners with foreclosure where "their lender
fail[s] to tap their [escrow] accounts to pay their annual property-tax bill." Convenience or
Curse, supra note 13, at 1.
57. Myers, supra note 13, at 1.
58. See Barry Meier, Lenders Accused on Escrow, N.Y. TIMES, April 25, 1990, at DI
(quoting former New York Attorney General Robert Abrams).
59. See, e.g., Myers, supra note 13, at 1 (reporting on a $100 million settlement against
GMAC Mortgage Corporation for "systematically forcing borrowers to keep more cash in their
escrow accounts than the federal law allows"); see also infra note 192 and accompanying text
(discussing where state attorneys general derive their authority to sue lenders for violations of
Section 10).
60. Myers, supra note 13, at 1.
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lenders to pay interest to borrowers on escrow funds, but the rates are extremely
low, and other states allow lenders to pay nothing.6' Shortcomings like these
have forced the American public to seek more effective legislation to combat
predatory lending.62
III. Establishing the Standard of Interpretation That Applies to
Section 10(a) 's Silence
A. General Approaches to Statutory Construction
As a general matter, courts use "statutory construction" to resolve the
question of whether a statute creates a private right of action, either expressly or
by implication.63 Its exercise, however, provokes some controversy. Courts
apply different approaches to statutory construction in order to determine the
meaning of a statute.64 This Section details the approaches and principles that
are crucial to the determination of whether a private right of action exists under
Section 10(a) of RESPA. It focuses on four main approaches: the textualist,
65
intentionalist, 66 totality of the circumstances,
67 and equity of the statute68
theories of construction.
61. See, e.g., David W. Myers, Inspect Your ImpoundAccountfor Overcharge Financing:
A Survey of the "Impound" Accounts Found Many Lenders Overestimate the Amount of Money
that Must Go Into the Accounts on a Monthly Basis, L.A. TIMES, May 6, 1990, Real Estate
Section, at 6 ("California lenders are required to pay a paltry 2% annual interest on [escrow]
accounts, even though they can sometimes have more than $1,000 of your money in them.
Lenders in some other states don't have to pay anything.").
62. See, e.g., Fogel, supra note 4, at 435-66 (describing the extent of predatory lending in
America and the need for a solution).
63. See, e.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-17(1979)
(discussing whether a statute creates a private right of action).
64. See, e.g., Morton Int'l v. A.E. Staley Mfg., 106 F.Supp.2d 737, 753 (examining
Section 127 of CERCLA "under rules of statutory construction for evidence of Congress's
intent").
65. See infra notes 69-86 and accompanying text (discussing the textualist school of
statutory construction).
66. See infra notes 87-94 and accompanying text (describing the intentionalist school of
statutory construction).
67. See infra notes 95-104 and accompanying text (exploring the totality of the
circumstances school of statutory construction).
68. See infra notes 105-13 and accompanying text (summarizing the equity of the statute
school of statutory construction).
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1. Textualist
Statutory construction begins with the statutory language and the
"assumption that the ordinary meaning of the language accurately expresses the
legislative purpose."69 Accordingly, when a court interprets a statute, it must
look to the language first.7° If the statute's language "speaks with clarity to
[the] issue," the inquiry ends there.7 Under this plain meaning rule, if the clear
language does not lead to absurd consequences, the words represent "the final
expression of the meaning intended. 7 2 If the statute's language is not clear,
courts look to other subjective factors such as legislative intent to help
determine the meaning of the statute.
Justice Holmes articulated a stricter textualist position: "[W]e do not
inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what the statute means.
7 3
Under this approach, courts interpret statutes based on objective, rather than
subjective, criteria.74 In Justice Scalia's words, "the text is the law and it is the
text that must be observed. 75  Some contend that the Supreme Court has
69. Engine Mnfrs. Ass'n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246,252 (2004).
70. See, e.g., Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469,475 (1992) (stating
that the language of a statute is "the beginning point" to its interpretation).
71. Id. ("In a statutory construction case, the beginning point must be the language of the
statute, and when a statute speaks with clarity to an issue judicial inquiry into the statute's
meaning, in all but the most extraordinary circumstances, is finished."); see id. at 476 ("[C]ourts
must give effect to the clear meaning of statutes as written."); see also Duncan v. Walker, 533
U.S. 167, 172 (2001) ("Our task is to construe what Congress has enacted... [beginning] with
the language of the statute."); Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255,257 (2000) ("[T]his Court's
approach to statutory construction... begins by examining the text, not by psychoanalyzing
those who enacted it.").
72. United States v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 278 U.S. 269,269 (1929) ("Where the language of an
enactment is clear and construction according to its terms does not lead to absurd or
impracticable consequences, the words employed are to be taken as the final expression of the
meaning intended."); see also Lamie v. United States, 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004) ("It is well
established that when the statute's language is plain, the sole function of the courts-at least
where the disposition required by the text is not absurd-is to enforce it according to its
terms.").
73. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 207 (1920).
74. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court's New Hypertextualism: An Invitation
to Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 CoLuM. L. REV. 749, 750 (1995)
(comparing textualist and intentionalist rules of statutory construction); see also Thomas W.
Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 352 (1994)
("The critical assumption is that interpretation should be objective rather than subjective; that is,
the judge should ask what the ordinary reader of a statute would have understood the words to
mean at the time of enactment, not what the intentions of the enacting legislators were.").
75. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 22 (1997); see also INS v. Cardoza-
Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,452-53 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that "[j]udges interpret
laws rather than reconstruct legislators' intentions").
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started to discard other canons of interpretation for this hypertextualist
approach.76 In fact, a five-to-four majority of the Court recently refused to look
beyond statutory text to resolve the disputed meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1367,
asserting instead that the statute's plain meaning was clear.77 Despite Justice
Ginsburg's strong alternative interpretation-supported by three other Justices
and the statute's legislative history78-the majority insisted that the statute
"simply... [was] not ambiguous. 7 9
Along the same lines, a strict textualist would insist that if Congress
wishes to create a new private right of action, it must do so clearly and
unambiguously. 80 Section 10(a)'s utter silence regarding private enforcement
makes the question of whether a private right of action exists under this
provision neither clear nor unambiguous. A truly textualist judge, therefore,
might never imply a private right of action under Section 10(a), nor under any
other similarly silent provision-for "implied" rights of action and "clear and
unambiguous terms" are oxymorons. 8' This strict approach could theoretically
wipe out implied rights of action from American jurisprudence altogether. The
Supreme Court, however, has never foreclosed the existence of judicially
implied private rights of action. In fact, the Court has specifically created
frameworks for the purpose of determining whether an implied private right of
76. See Merrill, supra note 74, at 351-52 (indicating that the Supreme Court has gone
through a historical transformation into a "hypertextualist" approach to statutory construction);
id. (stating that textualism functions as "a sophisticated theory of interpretation which readily
acknowledges that the meaning of the words depends on the context in which they are used").
77. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546,567 (2005) (refusing
to "look to other interpretive tools, including the legislative history ... simply because § 1367 is
not ambiguous").
78. See id. at 572 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The legislative history... provides powerful
confirmation of Justice Ginsburg's interpretation of the statute."); see also id. ("[Justice
Ginsburg] has demonstrated that 'ambiguity' is a term that may have different meanings for
different judges, for the Court has made the remarkable declaration that its reading of the statute
is so obviously correct-and Justice Ginsburg's so obviously wrong-that the text does not
even qualify as 'ambiguous."'). But see id. at 569-70 (indicating that the legislative history of
§ 1367 was a matter of some dispute).
79. See id. at 567 (concluding that § 1367 was unambiguous).
80. See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273,290 (2002) ("[I]f Congress wishes to create
new [enforceable] rights... it must do so in clear and unambiguous terms.... ."). Notably,
Exxon and Gonzaga represent two different, but closely related, textualist propositions.
Whereas Exxon forbids looking beyond the text of an unambiguous statute, Gonzaga obligates
Congress to create all rights of action in clear and unambiguous terms.
81. McCready v. White, 417 F.3d 700, 703 (7th Cir. 2005) ("[H]ow can an implied right
of action be phrased in clear and unambiguous terms, when statutory silence is what poses the
question whether a right may be implied?").
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action exists under a statute and, in some contexts, the Court has implied such a
private right of action.
8 2
In other cases, the Supreme Court has recognized that "the silence of
Congress is ambiguous."8 3 Section 10(a), in particular, does not "speak with
clarity to the issue" of enforcement. 84  In fact, it says nothing about
enforcement.8 5 This silence has led to contradictory interpretations among
86lower courts. Due to Section 10(a)'s silence regarding enforcement, the
question of whether a private right of action exists under this provision cannot
end with the statute's language. To be sure, congressional silence may be
unambiguous in some instances. In Section 10(a)'s case, however, Congress
has allowed courts to decide for and against implying a private right of action
without saying anything about it. Neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has
foreclosed the possibility of implying a private right of action under Section
10(a), and the courts remain split over the issue. Because of this lack of clarity,
courts must look beyond the language of Section 10(a)-to legislative intent.
2. Intentionalist
Choosing between the textualist and intentionalist approaches to statutory
construction is thought by some to "represent[] a fundamental issue which
pervades the law of statutory interpretation. 8 7 Some Supreme Court justices
have endorsed a "preference for the meaning of the statute over legislative
intent as a criterion of interpretation."88 Yet among the varying schools of
thought regarding statutory construction and judicial interpretation, courts
82. See cases cited infra note 135 (citing cases in which the Supreme Court has found an
implied private right of action).
83. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 388 (2000); see also id. at 388
(rejecting an argument that Congress's failure "to preempt [a] state Act demonstrates implicit
permission" because "the existence of conflict cognizable under the Supremacy Clause does not
depend on express congressional recognition that federal and state law may conflict"). But see
id. at 389 (Scalia, J., concurring) (criticizing the Court's recognition that "the silence of
Congress [may be] ambiguous").
84. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (noting that statutory interpretation ends at
the point where the statute's language speaks with clarity to the issue).
85. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text (introducing Section 10(a)).
86. See infra notes 174-77 and accompanying text (highlighting the controversy over the
issue of whether a private right of action exists under Section 10(a)).
87. NORMAN J. SINGER, 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45:05 (6th ed.
2000) (addressing "the problem of choice between these alternative criteria of decision"-
"intent of the legislature" versus "meaning of the statute").
88. Id. (referring to Justice Holmes, Justice Jackson, and Justice Frankfurter).
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continue to weigh the "intent of the legislature" most heavily. 89 Courts simply
use different factors to determine that intent. The separation of powers doctrine
obligates the judiciary to "construe statutes so that they carry out the will, real
or attributed, of the lawmaking branch of government." 90
The Supreme Court consistently endorses this approach.9  Thus,
legislative intent controls when the court can reasonably discover that intent
from the statute's language and underlying purpose.92 One can hardly debate
the principle.93 Where Congress has made its intent clear, courts "must give
effect to that intent.
9 4
89. See id. (stating that when interpreting statutes, "the intent of the legislature is the
criterion most often cited"); see also William S. Blatt, Interpretive Communities: The Missing
Element in Statutory Interpretation, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 629, 631-40 (2001) (referring to
legislative intent as the "traditional approach to interpreting statutes").
90. SINGER, supra note 87, § 45:05 (discussing the intent of legislature as a standard of
judgment for the interpretation of statutes); see also Richard J. Scislowski, Note, Jenkins v.
James B. Day & Co.: A New Defense of State Tort Law Against Federal Pre-emption-Is It
Legitimate?, 28 AKRON L. REv. 373, 386 (1995) ("[Iln reviewing a statute, a court must
interpret it in such a way as to promote, not defeat, the purposes of the Legislature in enacting
the statute in the first place."); cf Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275,287 (2001) (stating that
the Court has "abandoned [the] understanding" that "it is the duty of the courts to be alert to
provide such remedies as are necessary to make effective the congressional purpose expressed
by a statute"); id. ("Having sworn offthe habit of venturing beyond Congress's intent, we will
not accept [the] invitation to have one last drink.").
91. See Califano v. Wescott, 443 U.S. 76,94 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring) (stating that
a court cannot "use its remedial powers to circumvent the intent of the legislature"); see also
Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S. 320, 330 (2006) (reaffirming
Justice Powell's assertion in Califano); id at 321 ("The touchstone for any decision about
remedy is legislative intent."). Although Califano and Ayotte each dealt with the
constitutionality, as opposed to the enforceability, of statutory provisions, these general
principles of statutory construction assertedly also apply to facially unenforceable statutes such
as Section 10(a) of RESPA.
92. See SINGER, supra note 87, § 45:05 (stating that "all rules of statutory construction are
subservient" to legislative intent where that intent "can be reasonably discovered in the language
used").
93. See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275,286 (2001) (stating that "[t]hejudicial
task is to interpret the statute Congress has passed to determine whether" Congress intended to
create a private right of action); Suter v. Artist, 503 U.S. 347, 364 (1992) ("The most important
inquiry here.., is whether Congress intended to create the private remedy sought."); Middlesex
County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clanmers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 13 (1981) ("The key to the
inquiry is the intent of the legislature."); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444
U.S. 11, 15-16 (1979) ("[W]hat must ultimately be determined is whether Congress intended to
create the private remedy asserted.").
94. Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 336 (2000) (rejecting an interpretation that "would
subvert" the clear intent of Congress).
64 WASH. &LEE L. REV. 1159 (2007)
3. Totality of the Circumstances
"Ascertain[ing] congressional intent" often requires that courts
comprehend the "totality of the circumstances surrounding the statute's
enactment. " 95 Courts use the language, structure, background, and history of
the statute to determine that intent.96 Speaking for a majority of the Court,
Justice Stevens stated that when Congress leaves "the matter at large for
judicial determination, [the Court's] function is to decide what remedies are
appropriate in the light of the statutory language and purpose of the traditional
modes by which courts compel performance of legal obligations.
9 7
As Lord Blackburn98 stated over a century ago:
In all cases the object is to see what is the intention expressed by the words
used. But, from the imperfection of language, it is impossible to know what
our intention is without inquiring further, and seeing what the
circumstances were with reference to which the words were used, and what
was the object, appearing from those circumstances, which the person using
them had in view; for the meaning of the word varies according to the
circumstances with respect to which they were used. 99
Still today, courts must construe statutes "as a whole with reference to the
system of which it is a part."' 00 Justice Powell advocated something similar
when he said that "a court should attempt to accommodate as fully as possible
the policies and judgments expressed in the statutory scheme as a whole."' 0'
The Supreme Court has consistently adopted this approach to statutory
95. Cynthia Reed, Note, Time Limits for Federal Employees under Title III:
Jurisdictional Prerequisites or Statutes of Limitation?, 74 MINN. L. REV. 1371, 1394-95
(1990).
96. See Allison v. Liberty Sav., 695 F.2d 1086, 1091 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.,
dissenting) ("[A] court may not create a private right of action unless it has evidence-whether
based on the language, structure, background, or history of the statute .... ").
97. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 376 (1982).
98. See Editorial, Lord Blackburn, 9 HARv. L. REv. 420, 420-21 (1896) (referring to
Lord Blackburn as "the greatest English common law judge of recent years").
99. SINGER, supra note 87, § 45:05 (citing River Wear Comm'rs v. Adamson, LR., 2 AC
743 (1877)).
100. Id. § 45:05.
101. Califano v. Wescott, 443 U.S. 76,94 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring); see id. (asserting
that the Court should not "frustrate the clear intent of Congress"); see also Welsh v. United
States, 398 U.S. 333, 365-66 n.18 (1970) (stating that one must necessarily "consider the
degree of potential disruption of the statutory scheme" in choosing between two remedial
alternatives). Both Califano and Welsh dealt with the constitutionality, as opposed to the
enforceability, of statutory provisions. As general rules of statutory construction, however,
these principles assertedly apply to facially unenforceable statutes such as Section 10(a) of
RESPA as well.
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construction.t12 Courts look to the statutory language and policy, the legislative
scheme, the legislative history, and "concepts of reasonableness" in interpreting
a statute. 0 3 They also "consider the history of the subject matter involved" and
the underlying purposes of the statute. 04
4. Equity of the Statute
Courts may also apply the lesser-known "equity of the statute" doctrine' °s
which is also known as the doctrine of "equitable construction."' 0 6 This
doctrine asserts that "courts should apply a statute to situations outside its
express provisions when doing so is consistent with the equity or spirit of the
statute."'10 7 "Equity," in this context, takes on a different meaning than the
traditional definition of the term.10 8 Under this equitable construction doctrine,
"equity is synonymous with the 'spirit' or guiding 'principle' of the legislation
in question."'01 9
The "equity of the statute" doctrine seems to mimic the no longer viable
permissive implication doctrine which supported courts interpreting statutes in
102. See, e.g., K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281,291 (1988) ("In ascertaining the
plain meaning of the statute, the court must look to the particular statutory language at issue, as
well as the language and design of the statute as a whole."); see also Mastro Plastics Corp. v.
NLRB, 350 U.S. 270,285 (1956) ("In expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single
sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object
and policy.").
103. SINGER, supra note 87, § 45:05 (stating that "[o]ne reviews the policy behind the
statute, the legislative scheme of which the statute is a part, the legislative history, and concepts
of reasonableness along with the language of the statute in order to determine legislative
intent").
104. Id. (stating that "courts must consider the history of the subject matter involved, the
end to be attained, the mischief to be remedied and the purpose to be accomplished").
105. See SINGER, supra note 87, § 45:05 (stating that some court opinions "have sought
evidence of intent in the equity of the statute"); Mintz, infra note 106, at 308-15 (discussing the
"Equity of the Statute" doctrine); id. at 308 ("Most U.S. lawyers are unfamiliar with the doctrine
of equity of the statute."); see also Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Cenance, 452 U.S. 155, 157 (1981)
(applying equitable principles to an interpretation of the Truth-in-Lending Act).
106. See Joel A. Mintz, Can You Reach New Greens If You Swing Old Clubs?
Underutilized Principles of Statutory Interpretation and Their Potential Applicability in
Environmental Cases, 7 ENvT. LAW. 295, 308 (2001) (stating that the equity of the statute
doctrine is "sometimes called the doctrine of equitable construction").
107. Id.
108. See id. ("In this context, the term 'equity' has a meaning distinct from 'basic fairness'
between or among the parties and also from what Blackstone referred to as the 'correction of
that wherein the law, by reason of its universality, is deficient."').
109. Id.
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whatever way was necessary to effectuate congressional purposes."° The
Supreme Court does not apply this equity doctrine in most contexts."1' That is
not to say that the court has rejected the doctrine completely; for instance, the
Court often applies equitable tolling principles to limitations periods under
federal statutes. 1 2 Thus, application of the doctrine might yield favorable
results in some cases, 113 but the Court has not settled the question of when and
where it applies. The doctrine cannot, therefore, definitively answer the
question of whether a private right of action exists under Section 10(a). It does,
nevertheless, bear consideration when pondering the dispositive question of
legislative intent. Applying equitable principles might actually help courts
determine Congress's true intent where Congress has not made its intent clear.
B. Supreme Court Jurisprudence: Implying Private Rights ofAction
1. The Court's Digression from the Permissive Implication
Doctrine of the Past
"When Congress intends private litigants to have a cause of action to
support their statutory rights, the far better course is for it to specify as much
when it creates those rights."' 1 4 The Supreme Court, however, "has long
recognized that under certain limited circumstances, the failure of Congress to
do so is not inconsistent with an intent on its part to have such a remedy
available to the persons benefited by its legislation."" 5 Congress, therefore,
may express its intent to create a private right of action implicitly. 116 Courts
110. See supra note 31-32 and accompanying text (showing that the Supreme Court has
rejected the permissive implication doctrine that would imply whatever rights necessary to
effectuate the purposes of the statute).
111. See Mintz, supra note 106, at 313 (indicating that if the Supreme Court had applied
the equity of the statute doctrine, which it did not, "the result in the Sea Clammers case might
well have been different" (citing Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat ' Sea Clammers
Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981))).
112. See, e.g., Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43,44 (2002) ("Congress is presumed to
draft limitations periods in light of the principle that such periods are subject to equitable tolling
unless tolling would be inconsistent with statutory text.").
113. See Mintz, supra note 106, at 313 (noting that "in certain environmental cases"
brought under the Clean Water Act or the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act
"application of the equity of the statute doctrine might yield a more favorable result to advocates
of environmental protection and environmental justice").
114. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 374 (1982) (quoting
Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979)).
115. Id.
116. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-18 (1979)
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cannot avoid the unenviable task of determining whether Congress intended to
create a private right of action under a statute that does not explicitly provide
one. 117
In 1975, the Supreme Court decided Cort v. Ash,' 8 marking the beginning
of the Court's move away from the long-standing permissive implication
doctrine under which courts would imply whatever rights or remedies were
necessary to effectuate the purposes of a statute. 19 In Cort, a unanimous
Supreme Court applied a four-step inquiry to guide the analysis of implied
causes of action.1 20 The Court asserted that "several factors are relevant" to the
question of "whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly
creating one." 121 "First, is the plaintiff' a member "of the class for whose...
benefit" Congress enacted the statute, or, "does the statute create a federal right
in favor of the plaintiff?." 22 "Second, is there any indication of legislative
intent, explicit or implicit, either to create" or "deny" an implied right of action
in favor of the plaintiff?.123 "Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes
(indicating the intent of Congress to create a private right of action "may appear implicitly in the
language or structure of the statute, or in the circumstances of its enactment"); see also SINGER,
supra note 87, § 45:05 ("It should be noted that intent can be expressed by omission as well as
by inclusion of language.").
117. See Marburyv. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.").
118. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 80-85 (1975) (holding that Congress did not intend to
vest corporate shareholders with a federal right of action for violations under the Federal
Election Campaigns Act).
119. See, e.g., J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426,433 (1964) (stating that "it is the duty
of the courts to be alert to provide such remedies as are necessary to make effective the
congressional purpose" expressed by a statute); Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39
(1916) ("A disregard of the command of the statute is a wrongful act, and where it results in
damage to one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute is enacted, the right to recover
the damages from the party in default is implied."); see also Robert H.A. Ashford, Implied
Causes ofAction Under Federal Laws: Calling the Court Back to Borak, 79 Nw. U. L. REv.
227, 240-70 (1984) (arguing that the Supreme Court should return to the more permissive
implication doctrine).
120. See Cort, 422 U.S. at 78 (setting forth a four-part framework for implied cause of
action analysis); see also John A. Maher, Implied Rights ofAction and the Federal Securities
Laws: A Historical Perspective, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 783, 796 (1980) (stating that Cort
"reflects a great effort to restrain over-enthusiasm in inferring causes of action"); Christopher L.
Sagers, Note, An Implied Cause ofAction Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 95
MICH. L. REv. 1381, 1387 (1997) (stating that although these factors purported to merely "distill
the Court's existing jurisprudence," they mark a "clear break" from "the more permissive past").
121. Cort, 422 U.S. at 78.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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of the legislative scheme" to vest the plaintiff with that right?'2 4 Finally, "is the
cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law.. . so that it would be
inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?" 25 Thus,
under Cort, a private right of action exists where the plaintiff has standing and
the legislature intended to give him or her a right, so long as the right is
consistent with the underlying purposes of the statute and is not traditionally
relegated to state law.
In 1979, the Court held that "the central inquiry is whether Congress
intended to create, either expressly or by implication, a private right of
action." 126  Three other Supreme Court decisions in 1979 reaffirmed this
understanding.127 These cases arguably modified the Cori test by focusing the
inquiry on legislative intent,1 28 but the Court has never disclaimed the other
Cort factors. In fact, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed the Cort analysis as




126. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575 (1979).
127. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677,688-89 (1979) (holding that a female
who was allegedly denied admission to the medical schools of two private universities on the
basis of her sex had an implied private right of action against those universities under Title IX);
Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 9-21 (1979)
(holding that the existence of elaborate expressed causes of action compels the conclusion that
Congress did not intend the implication of additional private claims under the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act and the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972);
Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15 (1979) (stating that although
the Court sometimes emphasizes "the desirability of implying private rights of action in order to
provide remedies thought to effectuate the purposes of a given statute," the ultimate
determination rests on congressional intent); id. at 4-5 (finding a limited private remedy under
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 to void an investment advisers contract, but "no other
private causes of action, legal or equitable").
128. See Nancy Eisenhauer, Comment, Implied Causes ofAction Under Federal Statutes:
The Air Carriers Access Act of1986, 59 U. Cri. L. REV. 1183, 1195-1203 (1992) (contending
that "the Court effectively overruled the use of the Cort test in Transamerica" by simplifying the
inquiry to legislative intent).
129. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275,287 (2001) (highlighting Cort v. Ash as the
case in which the Supreme Court "abandoned" the permissive implication doctrine that would
imply whatever rights or remedies are necessary to effectuate the purposes of a statute).
Westlaw indicates that Cort v. Ash has been cited thousands of times and red flags the case as no
longer good for at least one point of law. See Westlaw, http://web2.westlaw.com (search for
"422 U.S. 66" under "Find this document by citation"; then follow "Citing References"
hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 1, 2007) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
Remarkably, however, despite all the negative treatment it has received, Cort has never been
overruled and lower courts continue to apply it today. See infra note 130 (illustrating the
viability of Cort).
130. See, e.g., Birkholm v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 447 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1161-63 (W.D.
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Clearly, the Supreme Court's willingness to imply private rights of action
has decreased. 3 ' During the last fifteen years, in particular, the Court shied
away from implying such rights on several different occasions.' 32 For the most
part, lower have courts adopted the same reluctant approach.
33
Wash. 2006) (applying the Cort v. Ash analysis to determine whether a private right of action
exists under Section 10); see also Walsh, supra note 21, at § 2(a) (stating that "[i]n deciding the
issue" of whether to imply a private right of action under a statute not expressly providing one,
'courts generally have applied the 4-part test established by the Supreme Court" in Cort v. Ash).
131. See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727 (2004) ("[Tjhis Court has
recently and repeatedly said that a decision to create a private right of action is one better left to
legislative judgment in the great majority of cases."); Middlesex, 453 U.S. at 11-19 (finding that
the existence of elaborate expressed rights of action meant that Congress did not intend to imply
additional private actions); Maher, supra note 120, at 783-86 (highlighting the Court's
digression from implying private rights of action under federal statutes). Compare J.I. Case Co.
v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964) (stating that "it is the duty of the courts to be alert to
provide such remedies as are necessary" to effectuate remedial purposes of legislation), with
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 287 (2001) (stating that the Court had "abandoned [the
Borak] understanding," under which courts interpreted statutes to effectuate statutory purposes,
and now would look no further than legislative intent).
132. See, e.g., Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 126 S. Ct. 2121, 2136-37
(2006) (finding no private right of action under a provision of the Federal Employees Health
Benefit Act of 1959); Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 287-90 (2002) (concluding that
provisions of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act that prohibit federal funding of
educational institutions with a policy or practice of releasing education records to unauthorized
persons create no personal rights to enforce under Section 1983); Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko,
534 U.S. 61, 66 (2001) (holding that no implied private right of action exists for damages
against private entities that engage in alleged constitutional deprivations while acting under
color of federal law); Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 280-92 (1998)
(finding that no implied private right of action exists for a student to recover monetary damages
for sexual harassment from one of the school district's teachers under Title IX unless an official
of the district has actual notice of misconduct and remains deliberately indifferent); Meghrig v.
KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 483-88 (1996) (holding that the citizen suit provision of the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act did not authorize a private cause of action to recover
the prior cost of cleaning up toxic waste that would not continue to pose danger to health or the
environment at the time of the suit); Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,
511 U.S. 164, 190-91 (1994) (refusing to recognize a right of action for aiding and abetting
under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Suter v. Artist, 503 U.S. 347,
355-60 (1992) (holding that the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Section
671(a)(15), did not confer on its beneficiaries a private right enforceable in a Section 1983
action). But see Morse v. Republican Party of Va., 517 U.S. 186,231-35 (1996) (finding that
an implied private right of action exists to enforce a section of the Voting Rights Act that
prohibited poll taxes).
133. See, e.g., Labickas v. Ark. State Univ., 78 F.3d 333, 334 (8th Cir. 1996) (noting that
the "critical inquiry... is whether Congress intended to create a private right of action");
Coosewon v. Meridian Oil, 25 F.3d 920, 929 (10th Cir. 1994) ("Absent an express grant of a
private cause of action, a mere proscription of behavior does not justify an inference of a private
cause of action for its violation; instead, there must be some evidence that Congress intended
one.").
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2. The Permissibility of Implying a Private Right of Action Under
Limited Circumstances
Although the Court prefers not to imply private rights of action, 134 it has
not ruled out implying private rights of action absolutely. "Most cases" or even
"the great majority of cases," does not encompass all cases. Private rights of
action, therefore, exist by implication in a limited number of cases.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court and other federal courts sometimes imply
private rights of action under federal statutes. 1
35
Some might insist that cases under different statutes offer little help.1
36
This Note's position, nevertheless, draws significant support from the Supreme
Court's 1982 decision, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
Curran,'37 in which the Court held that an implied private right of action
existed under the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA). 3 8 The Supreme Court has
never overruled this holding and Congress has, in fact, subsequently amended
the CEA now to include an express private cause of action. 3 9 The plaintiffs in
134. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727 (2004) ("[T]his Court has recently and
repeatedly said that a decision to create a private right of action is one better left to legislative
judgment in the great majority of cases."); see also Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275,285-
87, 293 (2001) (determining that a private right of action to enforce Section 601 of Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, prohibiting intentional discrimination in covered programs and
activities, did not include a private right of action to enforce disparate-impact regulations
promulgated under Title VI).
135. See, e.g., Morse v. Republican Party of Va., 517 U.S. 186, 231-35 (1996) (finding
that an implied private right of action exists to enforce a section of the Voting Rights Act that
prohibited poll taxes); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353,388
(1982) (locating an implied private right of action under the Commodity Exchange Act);
Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677,688-89 (1979) (establishing an implied private right
of action under Title IX of the Education Amendments); see also Rolland v. Romney, 318 F.3d
42, 52 (1 st Cir. 2003) (finding that the Nursing Home Reform Amendments to the Medicaid law
contained sufficient "rights-creating" language to imply a private right of action, in contrast to
Alexander v. Sandoval, in which the Supreme Court did not find such language); J.L., K.P. v.
Soc. Sec. Admin., 971 F.2d 260, 269-72 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that a private right of action
against the federal government existed under the Rehabilitation Act where "the government's
action... discriminate[d] on the basis of handicap").
136. See Allison v. Liberty Sav. 695 F.2d 1086, 1092 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.,
dissenting) ("We can get little help from cases under different statutes.").
137. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982).
138. Id. at 373-95; see also 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-27f (2000) (providing the Commodity
Exchange Act).
139. See 7 U.S.C. § 25 (2000) (providing an express private cause of action for violations
of the CEA). Congress has yet to provide an express private right of action under Section 10(a).
This makes little difference. The Supreme Court in Curran held that an implied private right of
action existed under the CEA before Congress finally got around to providing an express private
cause of action. The fact that Congress has not amended Section 10(a) to provide an express
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Curran brought an action against their futures commission broker to recover for
alleged fraud, deceptive practices, price manipulation, and failure to enforce
exchange rules. 40 Likewise, plaintiffs that seek recourse for violations of
Section 10(a) allege deceptive practices, overcharging of escrow accounts, and
failure to comply with RESPA's statutory provisions.
The CEA had "been aptly characterized as 'a comprehensive regulatory
structure to oversee the volatile and esoteric futures trading complex."
14 1
RESPA has been characterized in remarkably similar terms.142 Moreover, the
Court found that an implied private right of action existed under the CEA
despite the fact that its amendments created the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission to enforce its provisions. 143 Similarly, RESPA's amendments
provide administrative enforcement over subsection (c) of Section 10.144 The
Supreme Court held that futures traders who could prove injury from CEA
violations had an implied private right of action to redress those injuries.
45
Arguably, mortgage borrowers that can prove injury from violations of Section
10(a) of RESPA have an implied private right of action as well.
The Court stated that the "key" to its decision in Curran was the Court's
"understanding of the intent of Congress in 1974 when it comprehensively re-
examined and strengthened the federal regulation of futures trading."' 146 The
Court found that an implied cause of action under the CEA was clearly a part of
the "contemporary legal context" in which Congress undertook a
comprehensive reexamination and amendment of the CEA in 1974.147 Since its
inception, federal courts had "routinely and consistently recognized" an implied
private right of action does not necessarily imply that Congress did not intend to create an
implied private right of action under this provision.
140. See Curran, 456 U.S. at 367-73 (presenting the facts and procedural history of the
case).
141. Id. at 355-56.
142. See Robertson, supra note 42, at 273 (stating that RESPA has "transformed from a
seemingly benign consumer protection statute to an extensive piece of legislation that regulates
virtually all residential mortgage transactions from the time of the loan application through the
life of the loan").
143. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 365-67
(1982) (discussing the creation of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission).
144. See 12 U.S.C. § 2609(d) (providing that the Secretary of HUD shall assess penalties
for violations of subsection (c) of Section 10).
145. See Curran, 456 U.S. at 394 (stating that "persons who are participants in a
conspiracy to manipulate the market in violation" of their statutory duties are "subject to suit by
futures traders who can prove injury from [those] violations").
146. Id. at 378.
147. Id. at 381 ("[Ilt is abundantly clear that an implied cause of action under the CEA was
part of the 'contemporary legal context' in which Congress legislated in 1974.").
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private right of action under the CEA.148 The fact that subsequent amendments
left intact the provisions under which the federal courts had implied a cause of
action was itself evidence that Congress affirmatively intended to preserve that
remedy.
149
At first glance, this argument seems inapplicable to Section 10(a). Federal
courts, of course, could not have found an implied private right of action under
RESPA prior to its enactment, and federal courts did not "routinely and
consistently" find a private right of action under RESPA before its amendments
in 1990.150 This does not matter, however, because Congress both amended the
CEA and enacted RESPA in its original form in 1974.151 Congress did not
further amend the CEA to include an express private right of action until after
Curran was decided, several years after RESPA's enactment. 5 2  When
Congress enacted RESPA in 1974,' it arguably relied on the fact that federal
courts "routinely and consistently recognized" implied private rights of action
under the remarkably similar CEA. RESPA attacks deceptive practices in the
mortgage and banking industry, just as the CEA attacks deceptive practices in
the futures trading industry. Congress might very well have assumed that
courts would find an implied private right of action under Section 10 of
RESPA, just as they had done "routinely and consistently" under the CEA.
154
Therefore, Congress in 1974 arguably assumed that the creation of the right
under Section 10 was enough to confer a private right of action. The Sixth
Circuit, which was the first circuit court of appeals to address the issue of
whether a private right of action exists under Section 10-now Section 10(a)-
apparently found this reasoning compelling. 155 It concluded without analysis
148. Id. at 379.
149. See id. at 381-82 ("[T]he fact that a comprehensive reexamination and significant
amendment of the CEA left intact the statutory provisions under which federal courts had
implied a cause of action is itself evidence that Congress affirmatively intended to preserve that
remedy.").
150. See cases cited infra note 159 (citing cases that decided both for and against implying
a private right of action under Section 10 prior to 1990).
151. See Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-533, 88 Stat. 1724
(creating RESPA in its original form); Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389 (amending the CEA by creating the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission).
152. Futures Trading Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-444, § 235, 96 Stat. 2294 (1983)
(amending the CEA by adding a private right of action).
153. See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text (detailing RESPA's enactment).
154. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353,379 (1982)
(noting that federal courts "routinely and consistently had recognized an implied private cause
of action" under the CEA).
155. See Vega v. First Fed. Sav.& Loan Ass'n of Detroit, 622 F.2d 918,925 n.8 (6th Cir.
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that, as a simple matter of fact, an implied private right of action exists under
Section 10.156
This argument does not retroactively apply the permissive implication
doctrine that was in force in 1974. The Supreme Court has clearly rejected the
idea that courts should use whatever doctrine of implication was in force at the
time of the statute's enactment. 57 Instead, this argument accepts that the intent
of the legislature at the time of the statute's enactment controls implied rights of
action questions. In other words, courts can no longer interpret a statute in
whatever way is necessary to effectuate the purposes of the statute, but in order
to determine what an ambiguous statute means, they must look for evidence of
legislative intent at the time of the statute's enactment. The circumstances at
the time of RESPA's enactment assist in determining this congressional intent.
The 1990 amendments to Section 10 of RESPA merely confirm that
Congress intended to confer the same protections as Congress did in 1974.58
When Congress amended Section 10, it arguably assumed that it could leave
the original language, now designated as Section 10(a), alone and that an
implied private right of action would remain unaffected. Although some
federal courts between 1974 and 1990 decided both for and against finding an
implied private right of action under Section 10,159 Congress did not expressly
address the issue. To this day, Congress has never expressly created or denied
a private right of action under Section 10(a). When Congress amended RESPA
in 1990 it merely added additional protective provisions (b) through (d), and an
express administrative remedy for violations of subsection (c).1
60
The fact that Congress did not expressly provide administrative
enforcement for subsection (a) of Section 10 clearly indicates Congress's intent
to leave it alone. Congress arguably intended the language now designated as
subsection (a) of Section 10 to have the same meaning it had in 1974 when
RESPA was originally enacted. If it wanted to change the understanding that
1980) (stating that an implied private right of action exists under Section 10).
156. Id.
157. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 287 (2001) (denying a private right of
action that would have been inferred at the time that the statute-the Civil Rights Act of 1964-
was passed).
158. See supra note 20 (stating that the 1990 amendments designated the original language
of Section 10 as Section 10(a)).
159. Compare Vega, 622 F.2d at 925 n.8 (concluding that Congress did intend to create a
private right of action for Section 10 violations), with Allison v. Liberty Say., 695 F.2d 1086,
1091 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding in opposition to Vega that Congress did not intend to create a
private right of action under Section 10).
160. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (addressing the fact that no express remedy
exists for violations of Section 10(a)).
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an implied right of action exists to enforce violations of the escrow account
limitations under subsection (a), or even to clarify the meaning of Section
10(a), it "knew how to do so.0 ' 61 Courts should assume, therefore, that
Congress meant subsection (a) of Section 10, which is identical to the original
Section 10 Congress enacted in 1974,162 to retain its original meaning. By
saying nothing, the Congress of 1990 adopted the intent of the Congress of
1974.
C. The Obligation of Courts to Save and Not To Destroy
The obligation of courts to save and not to destroy statutory text underlies
the entire analysis. The Supreme Court has stated: "[I]t is a cardinal principle
of statutory construction that a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed
that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous,
void, or insignificant."'163 This principle permeates the entire field of statutory
construction. The Court "loath[es]" interpreting any statute in a way that would
render any part of it superfluous.'" The Court instead maintains that its
obligation is to "construe... statute[s] to give every word some operative
effect.' 65 Justice Harlan observed that this "general principle.., is meant to
guide the courts in furthering the intent of the legislature, not overriding it." '
66
The Court eloquently declared: "The cardinal principle of statutory
construction is to save and not to destroy."' 67 Courts must "give effect, if
161. See Allison, 695 F.2d at 1088 (asserting that if Congress wishes "to provide a private
damage remedy," it knows how to do so). Just as Congress knows how to create an express
right of action under a statute, it knows how to expressly forbid an implied right of action under
a statute. Congress has neither explicitly created nor denied a private right of action under
Section 10(a).
162. See supra note 20 (stating that in 1990 Congress designated the original text of
Section 10 as subsection (a)).
163. Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 489 n.13 (2004)
(reaffirming the "cardinal principle of statutory construction" to construe statutes so as not to
render any part of them "superfluous"); see also Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468,476
(2003) ("Absent a statutory text or structure that requires us to depart from normal rules of
construction, we should not construe the statute in a manner that is strained and, at the same
time, would render a statutory term superfluous."); TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31
(2001) ("We are reluctant to treat statutory terms as surplusage in any setting.").
164. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 166 (2004).
165. Id. at 167.
166. United States v. Zacks, 375 U.S. 59, 69 (1963) (expounding on the "duty" of the
Court "to give effect to all portions of a statute if that is possible").
167. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937) (stating that the Court
has "repeatedly held that as between two possible interpretations of a statute,... our plain duty
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possible, to every clause and word of a statute,"' 168 rather than to cripple "an
entire section." 169  Courts, of course, cannot escape this obligation when
interpreting Section 10(a).
IV Specific Application to Section 1 0(a)
When deciding the issue of whether a statute implies a private right of
action where it does not expressly provide one, federal courts typically apply
the four-part test that the Court established in Cort v. Ash.' 70 As the foregoing
discussion indicates, however, the Supreme Court now emphasizes legislative
intent above the other factors, 171 and consistently utilizes other applicable tools
of construction to help with the determination of that intent. 72 Importantly, the
Cort analysis cannot definitively resolve the issue alone. Discerning legislative
intent also requires reference to the "totality of the circumstances" and the
"equity of the statute" theories of construction.17 3
is to adopt that which will save the act"). Although this case involved interpreting a statute so
as to preserve its constitutionality, this saving principle is generally applicable to all statutory
interpretations. See, e.g., infra notes 168-69 (citing cases that applied the saving principle to
statutory construction).
168. Inhabitants of Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883) ("It is the duty ofthe
court to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute, avoiding, if it may be, any
construction which implies that the legislature was ignorant of the meaning of the language it
employed.").
169. See United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955) (refusing to adopt a
statutory interpretation that would require the Court "to emasculate an entire section" of the
statute).
170. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (establishing a four-pronged framework for
the determination of whether a statute implies a private right of action where it does not
expressly provide one); Walsh, supra note 21, at § 2(a) (stating that "[iun deciding the issue" of
whether to imply a private right of action under a statute not expressly providing one, "courts
generally have applied the 4-part test established by the Supreme Court" in Cort v. Ash).
171. See, e.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-16 (1979)
("[W]hat must ultimately be determined is whether Congress intended to create the private
remedy asserted."); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979) ("[O]ur task is
limited solely to determining whether Congress intended to create the private right of action
asserted.").
172. See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text (discussing general approaches to
statutory construction).
173. See supra notes 114-33 and accompanying text (discussing the current standard for
implying a private right of action); see also Allison v. Liberty Sav., 695 F.2d 1086, 1091 (1982)
(Posner, J., dissenting) ("[A] court may not create a private right of action unless it has
evidence-whether based on the language, structure, background, or history of the statute-that
Congress... would have [intended] the statute to be privately enforceable.").
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A. Cases Deciding Whether a Private Right ofAction Exists Under
Section 10 Generally
The issue of statutory silence makes the argument that a private right of
action exists under Section 10(a) challenging but plausible.' 74  Neither
Congress nor the Supreme Court has definitively resolved Section 10(a)'s
silence. Consequently, the circuits are split over whether a private right of
action exists under Section 10.175 The Eleventh, Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh
Circuit Courts of Appeals have held that no private right of action exists for
Section 10 violations generally. 76 The Sixth Circuit and at least two federal
district courts from the Second and Third Circuits have held the opposite. 1
77
1. Cases Deciding For Implying a Private Right ofAction
The strongest support for implying a private right of action under Section
10(a) comes from Judge Posner'S 178 compelling dissent in a 1982 Seventh
174. See Redington, 442 U.S. at 571 (stating that "implying a private right of action on the
basis of congressional silence is a hazardous enterprise, at best"); see also supra notes 63-135
and accompanying text (discussing approaches to statutory interpretation, focusing particularly
on implying private rights of action).
175. See Hardy v. Regions Mortgage, Inc., 449 F.3d 1357, 1359-60 (11th Cir. 2006)
(holding that no private right of action exists for violations of Section 10); Clayton v. Raleigh
Fed. Sav. Bank, 107 F.3d 865, 1997 WL 82624, at *1 (4th Cir. 1997) (same); Louisiana v.
Litton Mortgage Co., 50 F.3d 1298, 1301-02 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that Congress did not
intend to create a private right of action under Section 10); Allison, 695 F.2d at 1091 (7th Cir.
1982) (holding that no implied private cause of action exists under Section 10); see also DeBoer
v. Mellon Mortgage Co., 64 F.3d 1171, 1177 (8th Cir. 1995) (referring to the circuit split
regarding Section 10). Contra Vega v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Detroit, 622 F.2d 918,
925 n.8 (6th Cir. 1980) (concluding that Congress did intend to create a private right of action
for Section 10 violations). Notably, Congress did not resolve this split when it amended
RESPA in 1990. See supra note 20 (citing the 1990 amendments to Section 10).
176. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (citing the Eleventh, Fourth, Fifth, and
Seventh Circuit opinions, along with several federal district court opinions, holding that no
private right of action exists under Section 10); see also supra note 175 and accompanying text
(discussing the circuit split on the issue).
177. See Vega v. First Fed. Sav.& Loan Ass'n of Detroit, 622 F.2d 918,925 n.8 (6th Cir.
1980) (stating that a private right of action exists under Section 10); see also Heller v. First
Town Mortgage Corp., No. 97 Civ. 8575, 1998 WL 614197 at *2-4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 1998)
(ruling that Section 10 affords consumers a private right of action); Lake v. First Nationwide
Bank, 156 F.R.D. 615,620 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (holding that Section 10 allows for federal question
jurisdiction). But see McAnaney v. Astoria Fin. Corp., 357 F. Supp. 2d 578, 591 (E.D.N.Y.
2005) (disagreeing with Heller).
178. See Robert F. Blomquist, Dissent, Posner-Style: Judge Richard A. Posner's First
Decade of Dissenting Opinions, 1981-1991-Toward an Aesthetics ofJudicial Dissenting Style,
69 Mo. L. REv. 73, 74 (2004) (referring to Judge Posner as "a leading influence on American
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Circuit opinion,1 79 in which a three-to-two panel held that no private right of
action exists under Section 10.180 Judge Posner persuasively argued in his
dissent that Congress intended to create a private right of action under Section
10.18 1 He criticized the panel for "[setting] forth an approach, potentially of
general application, to deciding when federal statutes may be enforced by
private damage actions and [for creating] a conflict with another circuit."'
' 82
Focusing on the intent of the legislature, Judge Posner insisted that "Congress,
had it thought about the matter, would have wanted suits for restitution of
money withheld in violation of [S]ection 10 to be maintainable in federal
courts.' 183 Other federal district courts have followed Posner's reasoning to
find that a private right of action exists under Section 10.184
Judge Posner would have followed the 1980 Sixth Circuit opinion which
concluded, without analysis or discussion, that RESPA's legislative history
indicated that Congress intended to create a private right of action under
Section 10.185 The Sixth Circuit apparently relied on an inference that the
legislative history supported the existence of a private right of action under
Section 10, because RESPA's legislative history does not address the issue of a
private remedy specifically.186 Later courts have, for this reason, criticized the
Sixth Circuit's cursory and conclusory analysis of the issue. 87 These later
courts apparently did not consider the fact that the Sixth Circuit could have
legal opinion").
179. Allison v. Liberty Sav., 695 F.2d 1086, 1091-93 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.,
dissenting).
180. See id. at 1091 (majority opinion) (holding that Section 10 creates no private right of
action for borrowers).
181. See id. at 1091-93 (Posner, J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress did intend to create
a private right of action for borrowers under Section 10).
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1093.
184. See Heller v. First Town Mortgage Corp., No. 97 Civ. 8575, 1998 WL 614197, at *2-
4 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (ruling that Section 10 affords consumers a private right of action for redress
of violations); id. at *4 (concluding that "despite the considerable case law to the contrary... a
private right of action exists under Section 10"); Lake v. First Nationwide Bank, 156 F.R.D.
615, 620 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (holding that enough doubt exists as to whether Section 10 creates a
private cause of action to allow for federal question jurisdiction).
185. See Vega v. First Fed. Sav.& Loan Ass'n of Detroit, 622 F.2d 918,925 n.8 (6th Cir.
1980) (concluding that RESPA does create a private cause of action for violations of Section
10).
186. See Allison v. LibertySav., 695 F.2d 1086, 1089 (7th Cir. 1982) ("The parties' briefs,
the district court's opinion and our own research disclose no legislative history on the issue of
private remedies under [Section] 10.").
187. See, e.g., id. at 1091 (criticizing the Sixth Circuit's 1980 decision in Vega).
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been relying on RESPA's similarity to the CEA, a statute under which courts
had routinely and consistently implied a private right of action.
18 8
2. Cases Deciding Against Implying a Private Right ofAction
Most federal courts today find that RESPA leaves enforcement of Section
10 completely up to the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD), 189 leaving borrowers with no private remedy and essentially no
recourse. RESPA, however, does not provide such express administrative
remedies for violations of Section 10(a).190 Even if it did, HUD would only be
able to provide general protection to consumers.'19 By penalizing predatory
lenders, the Secretary can arguably deter RESPA violations and thereby protect
the general public, but the Secretary can offer no specific remedy to individual
consumers. Notably, state attorneys general can also provide general protection
by filing lawsuits against lenders that violate Section 10(a) on behalf of the
state and for the public good, but they too cannot represent individuals.'
92
Despite competing considerations, the Eleventh Circuit, in 2006, held that
no private right of action exists under Section 10, relying wholly on the fact
that the Secretary of HUD is authorized to assess penalties against lenders that
188. See supra notes 150-56 and accompanying text (asserting that the Sixth Circuit
apparently reasoned that Congress in 1974 assumed that the creation of the right under Section
10--now Section 1 0(a)--was enough to confer a private right of action (citing Vega, 622 F.2d
at 925 n.8)).
189. See, e.g., Hardy v. Regions Mortgage, Inc., 449 F.3d 1357,1359-60 (11th Cir. 2006)
(arguing that Congress did not intend to create a private right of action under Section 10 and
that RESPA authorizes the Secretary of HUD alone to assess penalties for Section 10
violations).
190. See 12 U.S.C. § 2609(d) (2000) (authorizing the Secretary of HUD to assess penalties
for violations of subsection (c), but not subsections (a) or (b)).
191. See id. § 2617(a) (giving the Secretary of HUD rule making and interpretive powers,
but no specific enforcement powers); see also infra note 283 and accompanying text (illustrating
that HUD enforcement provides some general but no individual protection).
192. See, e.g., Georgia v. Pa. R.R., 324 U.S. 439,447 (1945) (stating that a state, suing as
parens patriae, may assert the rights of its citizens based on federal laws); 72 AM. JuR. 2d
States, Territories, and Dependencies § 90 (2007) ("A state in its sovereign capacity may, in a
proper case, maintain a suit in behalf of its citizens for the protection of their rights.");
Romualdo P. Eclavea, Annotation, State's Standing to Sue on Behalf of its Citizens, 42 A.L.R.
FED. 23, § 3 (1979) ("It is settled that a state may in a proper case maintain, asparenspatriae, a
suit on behalf of its citizens for the protection of their rights."). This sort of general protection
may deter lenders from overcharging their borrowers' escrow accounts in the future, but it
provides no recourse to individual borrowers who have suffered injury as a result of Section
10(a) violations.
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fail to comply with subsection (c) of Section 10.193 The court noted that
"Congress unambiguously designated authority to the Secretary to enact
disclosure regulations" under Section 10.194 The court failed to address the
fact that Congress only expressly designated authority to the Secretary to
enforce the statement requirements under subsection (c). Instead, it made the
overly broad statement that "RESPA explicitly states that the Secretary of
HUD enforces violations of [Section] 10."195 The Eleventh Circuit's holding
followed the earlier decisions of the Fifth and Seventh Circuits, each of
which purported to apply the Cort 96 test.197 Each of these circuit courts of
appeals, however, effectively stopped its analysis after consideration of
legislative intent because it felt "comfortable" concluding that Congress did
not intend a private right of action under Section 10.198
Also in 2006, the United States District Court for the Western District of
Washington, applying the Cort test, concluded similarly that no private right
of action exists under Section 10.199 Notably, the plaintiffs in that case
alleged a violation of subsection (b) of Section 10, for which no express
remedy exists, but the court, similar to the Eleventh Circuit, did not address
subsection (b) specifically.2 00 Despite the fact that HUD does not have
express authority to enforce subsections (a) and (b) of Section 10, the court
assumed that HUD has authority to enforce these subsections. 20 1 The court
also found that Congress must not have intended to create a private right of
action under Section 10 because it provided private rights of action expressly
193. See Hardy v. Regions Mortgage, Inc., 449 F.3d 1357, 1359 (11 th Cir. 2006) ("Under
[Section] 10, no private right of action exists because 'the Secretary shall assess to the lender or
escrow servicer failing to submit the statement a civil penalty"' (quoting Section 10(d) of
RESPA)).
194. Id. at 1360 n.l.
195. Id. at 1360.
196. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
197. See Louisiana v. Litton Mortgage Co., 50 F.3d 1298, 1301 (5th Cir. 1995)
(concluding that Congress did not intend to create a private right of action under Section 10);
Allison v. Liberty Sav., 695 F.2d 1086, 1091 (7th Cir. 1982) (same); see also Clayton v. Fed.
Sav. Bank, 107 F.3d 865, 1997 WL 82624, at *1 (4th Cir. 1997) (affirming, without opinion, a
district court holding that no private right of action exists under Section 10).
198. See, e.g., Litton, 50 F.3d at 1301-02 ("We are comfortable in deciding for this circuit
that there is no private right of action under Section 10 of RESPA.").
199. See Birkholm v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 447 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1161-63 (W.D. Wash.
2006) (holding that no private right of action exists under Section 10).
200. Id.
201. Id.
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under Sections 6, 8, and 9 of RESPA.2 °2 Other lower courts have followed
this same line of reasoning.2 °3
B. Why Courts Should Imply a Private Right ofAction Under Section 10(a)
Instead of looking at all four Cort factors when deciding whether a private
right of action exists under Section 10, many federal courts have stopped their
analyses with the factor of legislative intent.204 By insisting that legislative
intent is clear, courts avoid creating a judicially implied private right of action
and, perhaps, usurping the role of the legislature. The Supreme Court has
emphasized, however, that "there is no merit to the argument... that the
judicial recognition of an implied private remedy violates the separation of
powers doctrine. 20 5 Courts cannot avoid their duty to say what the law is2°6 by
punting issues back to a legislature that may never expressly address them.
The Supreme Court expressly set up a four-step inquiry to guide the
analysis of implied rights of action questions and has never back-tracked.20 7
Where Congress clearly indicates its intent, the Court's inquiry ends without
consideration of the remaining Cort factors.20 8 Congress has not clearly
indicated its intent regarding private rights of action under Section 10(a).
Analysis of Section 10(a), therefore, cannot end without reference to the other
three Cort factors. These factors weigh strongly in favor of implying a private
right of action under Section 10(a). The following discussion demonstrates that
202. Id.
203. See, e.g., McAnaneyv. Astoria Fin. Corp., 357 F. Supp. 2d 578,591 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)
(finding that no private right of action exists under Section 10).
204. See, e.g., Louisiana v. Litton Mortgage Co., 50 F.3d 1298, 1301 (5th Cir. 1995)
("[O]nce we have concluded that Congress did not intend to create a private remedy, our inquiry
is at an end.").
205. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353,375-76 (1982); see
also Montana-Dakota Co. v. Nw. Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246,261-62 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) ("Courts... are organs with historic antecedents which bring with them well-
defined powers. They do not require explicit statutory authorization for familiar remedies to
enforce statutory obligations.").
206. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.").
207. See supra notes 118-25 and accompanying text (detailing the four-part Cort test).
208. See, e.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 24 (1979)
("The dispositive question remains whether Congress intended to create [a private right of
action]. Having answered that question in the negative, our inquiry is at an end."); Touche Ross
& Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 576 (1979) (stating that the inquiry ends where the "question
whether Congress, either expressly or by implication, intended to create a private right of action,
has been definitively answered in the negative").
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victims of Section 10(a) violations are clearly "members of the class for whose
especial benefit the statute was enacted," that Congress intended to create a
private right of action, that a private right of action would obviously "be
consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme," and that the
"cause of action is [not] one traditionally relegated to state law. '20 9
1. Members of the Class for Whose Special Benefit the Statute was Enacted
For most of the last century, the Supreme Court followed the principle that
"a disregard of the command of the statute is a wrongful act, and where it
results in damage to one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute is
enacted, the right to recover the damages from the party in default is
implied."2 0  Though previously dispositive, this factor, which is merely
relevant today, clearly weighs in favor of implying a private right of action
under Section 10(a). Victims of Section 10(a) violations unquestionably fit the
mold of "members of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was
enacted. 2 11 Congress specifically designed RESPA to protect mortgage
consumers and stifle predatory mortgage lending. 12 Section 10(a), in
particular, targets lenders' abuse of escrow accounts.21 3 Congress enacted this
provision for the very purpose of protecting victims from that harm.214
Mortgage borrowers that fall victim to violations of Section 10(a) are, therefore,
"members of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted. 2 15
2. Explicit and Implicit Indications of Congressional Intent
Two factors admittedly weigh against the argument that Congress intended
to create a private right of action under Section 10(a). First, RESPA does not
expressly create a private remedy for violations of Section 10,216 but it does
209. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (setting forth the four-part framework for
implied cause of action analysis); see also supra notes 118-25 and accompanying text (detailing
the four-part Cort test).
210. Tex. &Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916).
211. Cort, 422 U.S. at 78; see also supra note 122 and accompanying text (providing the
first prong of the Cort test).
212. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text (discussing RESPA's purposes).
213. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text (discussing Section 1 0(a)'s purposes).
214. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text (discussing Section 10(a)'s purposes).
215. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975); see also discussion supra note 209.
216. See 12 U.S.C. § 2609 (2000) (failing to provide language respecting private
64 WASH. &LEE L. REV. 1159 (2007)
expressly vest borrowers with a private right of action to recover damages for
violations of Section 6,217 Section 8,218 and Section 9219 of RESPA.220 Second,
Congress expressly provided administrative enforcement for subsection (c) of
Section 10 but has said nothing in regard to enforcement of subsections (a) and
(b).22 1 These factors, of course, do weigh against the implication of a private
right of action. Yet they only provide partial evidence of congressional intent.
They do not definitively exclude the possibility that Congress intended to create
a private right of action under Section 10(a). Sections 6, 8, and 9 of RESPA
differ fundamentally from Section 10(a),222 calling for express statutory
authority because these sections provide extraordinary remedies-treble
damages, minimum recovery, and attorney's fees.
223
Other factors positively evince that Congress intended to create a private
right of action under Section 10(a). Arguably, one cannot truly comprehend
congressional intent without reference to the statute as a whole and the equity
of the statute.224 To look at RESPA "as a whole" means to look at the statute's
remedies).
217. See id. § 2605 (regulating the servicing of mortgage loans and the administration of
escrow accounts); id. § 2605(f) (providing putative damages, costs, and attorney's fees for
violations of Section 6).
218. See id. § 2607 (prohibiting kickbacks and fee splitting for unearned services); id
§ 2607(d) (providing treble damages, costs, and attorney's fees as penalties for violations of
Section 8).
219. See id. § 2608 (prohibiting sellers from requiring buyers to purchase title insurance
from a particular insurer); id. § 2608(b) (providing that sellers are liable to buyers for an amount
equal to three times all charges made for such title insurance).
220. See id. § 2614 (providing jurisdiction to enforce Sections 6, 8, and 9 of RESPA).
Notably, there was no need for Congress, in RESPA itself, to confer jurisdiction on the federal
courts to enforce Section 10 because Sections 1331 and 1337 of the judicial code, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1331 & 1337, confer jurisdiction over such suits. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337 (2000);seealso
Allison v. Liberty Sav., 695 F.2d 1086, 1093 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J., dissenting) ("It is true
that Congress did not in RESPA itself confer jurisdiction on the federal courts to enforce
Section 10. But there was no need to [do so]."). Section 16 of RESPA, which confers
jurisdiction over actions brought under Sections 6, 8, and 9 of RESPA, does not "exclude
jurisdiction over suits under Section 10." Allison, 695 F.2d at 1092; see also Lake v. First
Nationwide Bank, 156 F.R.D. 615, 620 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (holding that Section 10 allows for
federal question jurisdiction)
221. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (emphasizing that Section 10 says nothing
about enforcement of subsection (a)).
222. See infra notes 258-60 and accompanying text (distinguishing Section 10(a) from
Sections 6, 8, and 9 of RESPA).
223. See infra notes 252-71 and accompanying text (rebutting the argument that no private
right of action exists under Section 10(a) because three previous sections of RESPA explicitly
provide private rights of action).
224. See supra notes 95-113 and accompanying text (discussing the totality of the
circumstances and equity of the statute approaches to statutory construction).
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language, the history of the subject matter involved, the underlying purposes of
the statute, and its legislative history.2 5 It also means that "courts should
attempt to accommodate.., the policies and judgments expressed in the
statutory scheme as a whole.,2 26 The fact that the legislative history says
virtually nothing about a private right of action under Section 10 means little.
The statute itself is clear enough. RESPA's very language states that its
purpose is to effectuate "a reduction in the amounts home buyers are required to
place in escrow accounts established to insure the payment of real estate taxes
and insurance." 227 To accomplish this aim, Section 10(a) specifically outlaws
lenders' maintenance of overlarge escrow accounts.228 A private right of action
is arguably the only way to effectively accomplish these aims.
Clearly, the structure and circumstances of RESPA's enactment support
implying a private right of action under Section 10(a). Congress enacted
RESPA in response "to perceived abuses in the real estate settlement
process. 2 29 The 1970s consumer protection movement successfully persuaded
Congress to combat predatory lending.23° Congress designed Section 10(a), in
particular, to attack lenders' overcharging of escrow accounts. 23' Without
implying a private right of action, however, Section 10(a) becomes practically
meaningless. 32 The fact that subsection (d) of Section 10 provides
administrative remedies for violations of subsection (c) does nothing to defeat
this evil. Nowhere does RESPA provide administrative remedies for violations
of subsection (a) of Section 10. In fact, HUD guidelines allow lenders to
violate Section 10(a). 233 RESPA's equity, or spirit, implies that Congress
intended to protect mortgage consumers and stifle predatory mortgage lending.
With no private remedy, Section 1 0(a) does neither.
Remarkably, RESPA does not provide a single express remedy for victims
whose lenders overcharge their escrow accounts. In fact, the statute makes no
225. See supra notes 96-104 and accompanying text (listing factors that are relevant
considerations under the totality of the circumstances approach to statutory construction).
226. Califano v. Wescott, 443 U.S. 76, 94 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring).
227. 12 U.S.C. § 2601(b) (2000).
228. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (describing Section 10(a)'s purposes).
229. 12 U.S.C. § 2601(a).
230. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (providing that Congress enacted RESPA as
a result of the 1970s consumer protection movement to regulate mortgage lending).
231. See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text (explaining the background and
purposes of Section 10(a)).
232. See infra notes 286-93 and accompanying text (arguing that Section 10(a) becomes
practically superfluous without a private remedy).
233. See infra note 274 and accompanying text (noting that HUD's administrative
regulations allow lenders to violate Section 10(a)'s escrow account limitation).
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mention of any type of enforcement for subsections (a) and (b)234 and says
nothing about private enforcement of subsection (c).235 "The natural remedy,"
for overcharging a borrower's escrow account, however, is "a suit by the
borrower to get the excess deposit returned to him. 236 The legal "duty declared
by Congress" on lenders not to overcharge their borrowers' escrow accounts
should not vanish just because Congress has not provided an express remedy.
237
It seems highly unlikely that Congress would have wanted mortgage lenders to
rob their borrowers, invest the illegally procured funds, and keep the proceeds,
in violation of the statute.238 Furthermore, when lenders effectively steal their
borrowers' money in violation of Section 10(a), invest the money for high rates
of interest, and keep the gains, they are clearly guilty of unjust enrichment.239
"You may not steal a man's pregnant cow and after it has given birth return the
cow and keep the calf",240 Congress could not have expected that lenders
would be free to do the very thing it proscribed and keep their ill gotten gain. 41
It should make little difference that Congress did not expressly create a private
right of action. Congress has not expressly denied one, and when legislative
intent is unclear courts should probably err on the side of protecting the class
for whose special benefit Congress enacted the statute. In short, no express
provision for a private right of action and no alternative remedy exist to protect
the pecuniary rights of borrowers under Section 10(a). These two factors
overwhelmingly support the inference that Congress, had it chosen to
specifically address the matter, would have wanted an express private right of
action under Section 10(a) to be cognizable in federal courts.242
234. See 12 U.S.C. § 2609(d) (2000) (providing no guidance regarding enforcement for
subsections (a) and (b)); see also 24 C.F.R. § 3500.17(m), (n) (2006) (detailing enforcement
regulations for subsection (c) but remaining silent regarding enforcement of subsections (a) and
(b)).
235. See 12 U.S.C. § 2609(d) (remaining silent regarding private enforcement).
236. Allison v. Liberty Sav., 695 F.2d 1086, 1092 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J., dissenting).
237. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353,376 (1982)
("A duty declared by Congress does not evaporate for want of a formulated sanction.").
238. See Allison, 695 F.2d at 1092 (Posner, J., dissenting) ("Congress could not have
wanted the lender to be able to retain the excess deposit in violation of the statute.").
239. See, e.g., Williams v. Nat'l Hous. Exch., Inc., 949 F. Supp. 650,652 (N.D. Ill. 1996)
(stating that a claim for unjust enrichment lies under Illinois law whenever "the defendant has
unjustly retained a benefit to the plaintiff's detriment, and.., the defendant's retention of the
benefit violates the fundamental principles of justice, equity, and good conscience.").
240. Id.
241. See id. ("No more should the defendant in this case be allowed to keep the increase in
its wealth from investing the plaintiff's money.").
242. See id. at 1093 ("[T]he nature of the right created, a pecuniary right of borrowers,
coupled with the absence of express provision of any alternative remedy to damages for the
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Congress could not have intended Section 10(a) to have no practical
effect. This invites the question: Why has Congress not stepped in to clarify
the statute and expressly provide a cause of action given the problem of
predatory lending? Perhaps the lending industry strongly discourages Congress
from getting involved.243 Even HUD, the agency specifically charged with
some enforcement power under RESPA, has unsuccessfully sought clarification
from Congress regarding its enforcement power.244 No matter the reason why
Congress has not stepped in, lenders that violate Section 10(a) harm consumers
in a way that Congress has explicitly forbidden 245 and the resulting damage is
national in scope.246 Chief Justice Marshall's words must still have some force:
enforcement of that right, supports an inference that Congress... would have wanted suits for
restitution money withheld in violation of [S]ection 10.").
243. See Myers, supra note 13, at 1 (quoting one consumer advocate as saying that
"bankers... really put on a full-court press" to oppose consumer protection legislation that
would require them to pay borrowers over five percent interest on escrow accounts).
244. See id. (quoting Frank Keating, HUD's former chief lawyer as saying: "We've asked
Congress to resolve... conflict[s] [between HUD regulations and RESPA], and we've asked
Congress to give us power to enforce the two-month cushion rule [under Section 10(a)]. So far
we've gotten neither."). To this day, Congress has not given HUD specific enforcement power
over Section 10(a), despite the popular notion that HUD alone can enforce Section 10(a).
245. See Sagers, supra note 120, at 1383 (clarifying that "banks that violate [S]ection 10
engage in a practice harmful to consumers that Congress has determined should be unlawful");
id. (specifying that "escrow accounts nationwide now represent a huge store of mortgage
consumers' funds"); see also Pillsbury supra note 19, at 517 n.7 (noting that in 1973 the
General Accounting Office estimated that homeowners lost $235,000,000 annually in possible
interest income to escrow accounts). Sagers argues that "an action should be implied under
[S]ection 10 because RESPA was enacted at a time when Congress relied on a more permissive
judicial implication doctrine." See Sagers, supra note 120, at 1384-85 (summarizing the Note's
arguments). He concedes that "if RESPA were enacted in its present form today, a claim for an
implied cause of action would probably fail." Id.; see also id. at 1385 n. 19 (explaining that "it is
unlikely that, if [S]ection 10 were enacted today, courts would recognize a private action"). The
Supreme Court has since rejected the kind of reasoning Sagers used. See Alexander v.
Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 287 (2001) (denying a private right of action that would have been
inferred at the time that the statute-the Civil Rights Act of 1964-was passed). This Note, in
contrast, asserts that even under current standards of statutory interpretation, the courts should
imply a private right of action under Section 10(a).
246. See Sagers, supra note 120, at 1383 (demonstrating that the manipulation of mortgage
consumers' funds "can result in harms of national scope"); S. REP. No. 93-866, at 13 (1974)
(reporting that high settlement charges depress the housing market "by making it impossible for
moderate income families to afford to purchase a home"); see also Leo Grebler & Sherman J.
Maisel, Determinants of Residential Construction, in IMPACTS OF MONETARY POLICY 475,491
(Commission on Money and Credit ed., 1963) (reporting on research findings that "short-run
fluctuations in residential building have resulted mainly from changes in financial conditions
labeled as ease of borrowing, availability of mortgage funds, or supply of mortgage credit");
KENNETH T. ROSEN, AFFORDABLE HOUSING 61, 75-78 (1984) (asserting that weaknesses in the
housing industry can result in severe harms to the general economy).
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"[W]here a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon
the performance of that duty, it seems ... clear that the individual who
considers himself injured, has a right to resort to the laws of his country for a
remedy .... ,," Courts should not blithely assume that Congress intended to
leave borrowers with no recourse and to let predatory lenders go virtually scot-
free.
Although the Supreme Court has grown increasingly textualist,2 48 it has
never foreclosed the possibility of judicially implied private rights of action.
The Court has never explicitly rejected the intentionalist theory of statutory
construction, nor has it refused to look beyond the language of the statute and
to the totality of the circumstances surrounding its enactment to determine
legislative intent.2 49 These methods of statutory construction remain viable
tools for the interpretation of statutes that are silent or too ambiguous regarding
a particular issue to support a plain meaning interpretation. In this case, at
least, they point toward implying a private right of action.
3. Private Right ofAction Consistent with Purposes of Statutory Scheme
Any argument that a private right of action would run counter to RESPA's
purposes stretches the imagination. Congress created RESPA-Section 10(a)
in particular-to protect consumers and stifle predatory lending. ° IfRESPA's
purposes alone drove the analysis, an implied private right of action would exist
under Section 10(a) without question. Likely no controversy would exist over
the matter because implying a private right of action under Section 10(a) can
only help effectuate RESPA's purposes whereas denying this right simply cuts
against RESPA's purposes. Implying a private right of action under Section
10(a) can help consumers protect themselves from predatory lenders by
providing an effective mechanism by which they can seek true recourse for
lenders' overcharging of escrow accounts and can deter lenders from
overcharging other consumers. Denying borrowers this right can only do the
opposite by providing no specific recourse and by allowing predatory lenders,
as a consequence, to violate Section 10(a) without the risk of private action.
247. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 166 (1803).
248. See supra Part III.A. 1 (discussing the textualist method of statutory construction).
249. See supra Part III.A.2 (discussing the intentionalist method of statutory construction);
supra Part III.A.3 (discussing the totality of the circumstances method of statutory
construction).
250. See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text (detailing the purposes of RESPA and
Section 10(a)).
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4. Private Remedy Not Traditionally Relegated to State Law
A private remedy for violations of Section 10(a) is not traditionally
relegated to state law. Plaintiffs generally can, however, turn to state consumer
protection statutes for some related protection. For example, they can plead
state claims related to misapplication of funds or unfair and deceptive
practices z.25 Thus, state consumer protection statutes provide some protection
to mortgage borrowers from predatory lenders. Yet, they do not provide
specific recourse for violations of Section 10(a), which is a distinct federal
right. They merely soften the blow by providing a related remedy under state
law. In other words, state consumer protection statutes may provide consumers
with a mechanism by which they can seek damages against their lender for
predatory lending practices, but these statutes do not provide consumers with a
mechanism by which they can seek damages specifically for their lender's
overcharging of escrow accounts.
C. Addressing Counter-Arguments
Many federal courts have insisted that no private right of action exists
under Section 10(a) because-in contrast to Section 10(a)'s silence--Congress
expressly provided private rights of action for violations of Sections 6, 8, and 9
of RESPA.252 Arguments like this depend on the so-called "negative pregnant"
rule of statutory construction, which holds that the inclusion of a term in one
253section of a statute implies its intentional exclusion from another section.
Under the negative pregnant rule, "express mention is implied exclusion."
254
251. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (noting that mortgage consumers can turn to
state consumer protection statutes for some redress).
252. See, e.g., McAnaney v. Astoria Fin. Corp., 357 F. Supp. 2d 578, 590 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)
(stating that unlike other sections of RESPA, Section 10 says nothing regarding private
remedies, indicating that Congress did not intend to create a private right of action under
Section 10) (citing Louisiana v. Litton Mortgage Co., 50 F.3d 1298, 1301 (5th Cir. 1995));
Bergkamp v. N.Y. Guardian Mortgagee Corp., 667 F. Supp. 719, 722-23 (D. Mont. 1987)
(stating that borrowers have no private right of action under Section 10 because the statute and
legislative history say nothing about a private remedy, whereas the sections immediately
preceding Section 10 expressly provide private remedies).
253. See, e.g., Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 59-60 (1995) (rejecting "as unsound" an
argument that relied on the negative pregnant rule of statutory construction).
254. Charlene Carres, Legislative Efforts to Limit State Reproductive Privacy Rights, 25
FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 273, 296 (1998).
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The Supreme Court has often expressly rejected this "expressio unius est
exclusio alterius" type of reasoning.255 Indeed, Cort v. Ash itself rejected this
doctrine. 6 The fact that a private remedy appears in one section but does not
appear in another does not necessarily imply the negative inference. The rule
has failed to support such an inference on several different occasions 257 and
cannot support the inference that no private right of action exists under Section
10(a). Sections 6, 8, and 9 of RESPA provide extraordinary remedies-treble
damages, minimum recovery, and attorneys' fees-which always require
express statutory authority.258 In sharp contrast to these remedies, "there is
nothing extraordinary about the [natural] remedy sought" for Section 10(a)
violations.259 Their provision, therefore, does not suggest that Congress did not
255. See, e.g., Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 168-69 (2003) ("The canon
expressio unius est exlusio alterius does not apply to every statutory listing or grouping; it has
force only when the items expressed are members of an associated group or series, justifying the
inference that items not mentioned were excluded by deliberate choice, not inadvertence.")
(emphasis added); United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 65 (2002) (stating that "the canon that
expressing one item of a commonly associated group or series excludes another left
unmentioned is only a guide, whose fallibility can be shown by contrary indications that
adopting a particular rule or statute was probably not meant to signal any exclusion of its
common relatives"); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 80-84 (2002)
(disallowing use of the interpretive canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius to show that the
harm-to-others provision in the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 excluded the harm-to-
self defense); Field, 516 U.S. at 67-68 (stating that "where there are multiple contenders
remaining ... the inference from the negative pregnant does not finish the job"); see also Bums
v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 136 (1991) ("An inference drawn from congressional silence
certainly cannot be credited when it is contrary to all other textual and contextual evidence of
congressional intent."). But see Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395, 404 (1991)
("[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in
another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and
purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.").
256. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11,29 (1979) (White,
J., dissenting) (noting that Cori itself rejected the negative pregnant doctrine).
257. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 80-84 (2002) (stating that
the "expressio unius" canon "fail[ed] to work" in showing that the "threat-to-others" provision
under the Americans with Disabilities Act excluded the "threat-to-self" defense) (emphasis
added); United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 65 (2002) (rejecting use of the negative pregnant
rule where it would support a finding that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(h) implied
that Rule 52(b) had no application to Rule 11 errors, thereby partially repealing Rule 52(b) by
implication); Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 67 (1995) (refusing to elevate "the negative pregnant
argument... to the level of interpretive trump card").
258. See, e.g., Heller v. First Town Mortgage Corp., No. 97 Civ. 8575, 1998 WL 614197,
at *2-4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 1998) (distinguishing Sections 6, 8, and 9 of RESPA from Section
10); Allison v. Liberty Sav., 695 F.2d 1086, 1091-93 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J., dissenting)
(rejecting the arguments for not implying a private right of action under Section 10).
259. Allison, 695 F.2d at 1092 (Posner, J., dissenting).
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intend Section 1 0(a) to provide normal remedies for consumers. 260 Applying
the "negative pregnant rule" to find that no private right of action exists under
Section 1 0(a), in fact, cuts "contrary to all other textual and contextual evidence
of congressional intent., 26' The doctrine does not show "that Congress did not
want victims of [Section 10(a)] violations to be able to get their money back
through suits in federal courts."
2 62
Indeed, RESPA's purposes make it illogical that Congress would
intentionally give borrowers a private right of action for violations of Sections
6, 8, and 9 of RESPA, but purposely refuse to provide a private right of action
for violations of Section 10(a). The injuries resulting from violations of
Section 10(a) mirror those resulting from violations of Sections 6, 8, and 9 of
RESPA. Section 6 requires that lenders fully disclose and provide notice to
borrowers of any assignment, transfer, or sale of their loan.2 63 Section 8
proscribes kickbacks and unearned fees.2 4 Section 9 prohibits sellers from
requiring buyers to use a particular title insurance265 policy. 266 Sections 6, 8, 9,
and 1 0(a) all regulate forms of dishonesty that predatory lenders use to profit at
borrowers' expense. Ironically, of these four provisions, only Section 10(a)
clearly purports to protect borrowers from predatory lenders.267 Section 6
protects borrowers from problems that may arise from the assignment, sale, or
transfer of the servicing of their loan.268 Section 8 protects borrowers from
individuals involved in real estate transactions.269 Section 9 protects borrowers
260. See Heller, 1998 WL 614197, at *3 (summarizing Judge Posner's arguments for
implying a private right of action under Section 10) (citing Allison, 695 F.2d at 1091-93
(Posner, J., dissenting)).
261. Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 136 (1991); see also supra note 255 and
accompanying text (stating that the Supreme Court often rejects the negative pregnant rule of
construction).
262. Allison, 695 F.2d at 1092 (Posner, J., dissenting).
263. See 12 U.S.C. § 2605(a)-(b) (2000) (providing disclosure and notice requirements for
the servicing of mortgage loans and the administration of escrow accounts).
264. See id. § 2607 (placing broad prohibitions on any unearned fees).
265. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 819 (8th ed. 2004) (defining title insurance as "[a]n
agreement to indemnify against loss arising from a defect in title to real property, usu[ally]
issued to the buyer of the property by the title company that conducted the title search").
266. See 12 U.S.C. § 2608 (stating that "[n]o seller of property... shall require directly or
indirectly, as a condition to selling the property, that title insurance covering the property be
purchased by the buyer from any particular title company").
267, See id. § 2609 (placing escrow limitations on lenders, but not on sellers or other
individuals, to prevent abusive uses of escrow funds).
268. See id. § 2605 (regulating the assignment, sale, or transfer of any federally related
mortgage loan, but not the terms and conditions of the loan).
269. See supra note 264 and accompanying text (discussing Section 8 of RESPA).
64 WASH. & LEE L. REV 1159 (2007)
270
from sellers.2 0 Congress arguably intended borrowers to have an implied
private right of action against lenders for violations under Section 10(a), just as
they have express private rights of action for violations under Sections 6, 8, and
9.271
The argument that Congress intended to limit enforcement of Section 10
as a whole to administrative remedies through HUD also holds no weight. For
one thing, RESPA's drafters intended to protect borrowers "without expanding
the federal bureaucracy., 272  Additionally, subsection (d) of Section 10
explicitly provides administrative enforcement for subsection (c) only.273 This
cannot mean that Congress intended to limit enforcement of subsections (a) and
(b) to administrative remedies. And, in fact, HUD's administrative regulations
leave plenty of room for lenders to violate Section 10(a)'s escrow account
274limitation. HUD, moreover, admits no legal authority to pursue violators of
Section 10(a).275
Furthermore, arguing that Congress intended to limit enforcement of
Section 10 as a whole to administrative remedies necessarily extends
administrative enforcement to subsections (a) and (b).276 This contradicts the
assertion that Congress intended not to extend a private right of action under
RESPA to Section 10.277 Subsection (d) of Section 10 provides an express
270. See supra note 266 and accompanying text (discussing Section 9 of RESPA).
271. See 12 U.S.C. § 2614 (2000) (providing jurisdiction to enforce Sections 6, 8, and 9 of
RESPA).
272. See Sagers, supra note 120, at 1398 (stating that "RESPA's drafters expressed
animosity toward government expansion, which strongly suggests they intended [S]ection 10 to
be enforced by means other than bureaucratic oversight" (citing S. REP. No. 93-866, at 4-5
(1974); H.R. REP. No. 93-1177, at 5 (1974) ("[H]eavy administrative involvement is likely to
create a bureaucratic monstrosity."))).
273. See 12 U.S.C. § 2609(d) (providing penalties through administrative enforcement for
violations of subsection (c), which regulates escrow account statements, but not for violations of
subsection (a), which prohibits overcharging escrow accounts, or (b), which requires proper
notification of escrow shortages).
274. See Myers, supra note 13, at 1 ("HUD's chief lawyer... admits that his own agency's
regulations allow lenders to violate [Section 10(a) of] RESPA by keeping more than a two-
month cushion in reserve."); see also 24 C.F.R. § 3500.17 (m), (n) (2006) (detailing
enforcement regulations for Section 10(c) only--effectively allowing lenders to violate Section
10(a)).
275. See Myers, supra note 13, at 1 (stating that, according to HUD's then chief lawyer,
"even though HUD regulations may conflict with RESPA, [the] agency doesn't have any legal
authority to pursue violators.").
276. See supra notes 189-90 and accompanying text (addressing the argument that the
Secretary of HUD alone should assess penalties for Section 10 violations).
277. See supra notes 189-201 and accompanying text (addressing the argument that no
private right of action exists under Section 10).
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administrative remedy for violations of subsection (c) only.2 78 Similarly,
Section 16 of RESPA explicitly provides federal jurisdiction for actions
brought under Sections 6, 8, and 9, but not 10.279 It is clearly inconsistent to
argue that administrative enforcement extends beyond its explicit terms in
subsection (d) of Section 10 but that a private right of action does not extend
beyond its explicit terms under Section 16. Because of this contradiction, the
argument fails. A private right of action under RESPA arguably extends to
Section 10(a).
Even if HUID-the agency with some enforcement power under RESPA-
had express authority to enforce Section 10(a), HUD would still not have the
ability to enforce Section 10(a) by itself. HUD does "not have the resources or
the time to prosecute each alleged violation or to provide immediate relief for
borrowers faced with imminent foreclosure., 280 Administrative enforcement
through HUD "cannot adequately address the needs of mortgage borrowers or
achieve RESPA's goals."2 8' State attorneys general similarly lack adequate
resources to effectively enforce Section 10(a).282 Even if HUD and state
attorneys general had adequate time and resources to prosecute each Section
10(a) violation, they would continue to provide only general-not individual-
283protection. Individual consumers would still be left with no specific remedy.
278. See 12 U.S.C. § 2609(d) (2000) (providing an express remedy for subsection (c) but
not for subsections (a) or (b) of Section 10).
279. See 12 U.S.C. § 2614 (providing jurisdiction to enforce Sections 6, 8, and 9 of
RESPA); see also R. Elizabeth Topoluk, RESPA, HOEPA and High-Cost Mortgage Litigation
andRelated Developments, 55 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 62,65 (2001) (reporting that Section
16 of RESPA provides explicitly for private rights of action only under Sections 6, 8, and 9 of
RESPA).
280. Fogel, supra note 4, at 459-60 (citing Predatory Lending: Are Federal Agencies
Protecting Older Americans from Financial Heartbreak?: Hearing Before the S. Spec. Comm.
on Aging, 108th Cong. 60-61 (2004) (statement of Gavin Gee, Director of Idaho Department of
Finance)); see also Francesca S. Laguardia, Enforcing the Fair Housing Act: Can Agency
Interpretations Override Congressional Intent in Anti-Discrimination Legislation?, 9 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 535, 542 (2006) (providing that state "[a]ttomeys [g]eneral are more likely
to have the resources and capability to vigorously enforce th[e] laws," than the agencies charged
with enforcement); cf Fogel, supra note 4, at 460 (stating that "consumers have been
unsuccessful in their efforts to convince Congress to provide an express private right of action
under RESPA" (citing Margot Sanders, The Increase in Predatory Lending and Appropriate
Remedial Actions, 6 N.C. BANKING INST. 111, 121 (2002))).
281. Sagers, supra note 120, at 1398; see also id. (arguing that "administrative enforcement
of Section 10 ... [is] inadequate").
282. See supra note 59-60 and accompanying text (pointing out that state attorneys general
lack adequate time and resources to effectively enforce Section 10).
283. See, e.g., Diane L. Slifer & Paul H. Shieber, Beware of "Kickbacks": HUD'sRecent
RESPA Enforcement Actions, 123 BANKING L.J. 519, 519 (2006) (reviewing several recent
settlement agreements entered into by HUD with lenders in RESPA enforcement proceedings);
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Although RESPA's purposes are not dispositive, s4 they support the controlling
inference that Congress intended for courts to imply a private right of action
under Section 10(a).28 5
D. Other Pertinent Considerations
Refusing to imply a private right of action under Section 10(a) renders this
provision's language practically superfluous. Section 10(a) might not be utterly
without teeth,286 but because HUD, state attorneys general, and state consumer
protection statutes do so little,287 courts should arguably avoid interpreting
Section 10(a)'s silence to deny a private right of action. Without an implied
private right of action, the language of Section 10(a) becomes insignificant. It
should make little difference whether state consumer protection statutes can
provide remedies in some roundabout way for Section 10(a) violations. If
states were meant to take care of the problem, Congress would not have passed
RESPA.
Judge Posner remarked that "[i]t is, of course, possible that the banking
industry managed to get [S]ection 10 enacted without teeth,. . . [b]ut there is no
indication that it did., 28   The fact that Judge Posner argued in favor of
implying a private right of action under Section 10-now Section 10(a)-
before the 1990 amendments added subsections (b) through (d) and an
administrative remedy for violations of subsection (c), makes little
see also supra note 59 and accompanying text (discussing a $100 million settlement agreement
that GMAC entered into for Section 10(a) violations). These settlement agreements contemplate
penalties against predatory lenders, but do not provide remedies to individual borrowers.
284. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text (stating that congressional purposes are
not controlling but that they are highly relevant to the determinative question of legislative
intent).
285. See supra Part II.A (discussing the purposes of RESPA and Section 10(a)).
286. See Allison v. Liberty Sav., 695 F.2d 1086, 1092 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.,
dissenting) (noting that consumers can complain to the agency with regulatory authority over
their lender, which might result in a refund for their excess deposits, but cannot file suit for
damages); supra note 42-44 and accompanying text (remarking that mortgage consumers can
fall back on related state consumer protection statutes); supra note 192 and accompanying text
(discussing the authority of state attorneys general to file suit on behalf of the state for violations
of Section 10(a)).
287. See supra note 251 and accompanying text (emphasizing that state consumer
protection statutes provide some related protection but offer no specific recourse for violations
of Section 10(a)); supra notes 280-83 and accompanying text (discussing the inadequacy of
HUD and state attorneys general to enforce Section 10(a) effectively).
288. Allison, 695 F.2d at 1093 (Posner, J., dissenting).
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difference. 289 His point remains valid. To this day, RESPA provides no
express remedy for subsections (a) or (b). Subsection (a) of Section 10 attacks
something RESPA meant to eliminate, perhaps above all other abuses of the
real estate settlement process-overcharging escrow accounts. 290 As Judge
Posner observed, Senator Proxmire described the bill which became RESPA as
"a major defeat for consumers and a stunning victory for the real estate
settlement lobby," because the bill did not go far enough in stifling predatory
mortgage lending practices.29' Senator Proxmire did not, however, go so far as
to complain "that [S]ection 10 lacked teeth. '292 Arguably, he would have "if he
had thought that the banking industry had succeeded in defanging the
section. 
2 93
Clearly, "[a]mbiguous contract terms, weak enforcement provisions, and
numerous statutory exceptions" debilitate RESPA's protective purposes. 294 If
RESPA indeed fails to provide a private right of action under Section 10(a), it
does nothing to protect borrowers from unnecessarily high settlement charges
and fails to limit the size of escrow accounts lenders may establish to pay taxes
and insurance premiums. 295 To find that no private right of action exists under
Section 10(a) adds, moreover, to a collective failure of federal consumer
protection legislation to protect consumers adequately.
296
289. See Louisiana v. Litton Mortgage Co., 50 F.3d 1298, 1301 (5th Cir. 1995)
(emphasizing that Congress amended Section 10 after Allison); see also supra note 20
(discussing the 1990 amendments to Section 10).
290. See supra Part II.A (introducing the purposes of Section 10(a) of RESPA).
291. Allison, 695 F.2d at 1093 (Posner, J., dissenting) (citing S. REP. No. 93-866, at 13
(1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6546, 6557).
292. Allison v. Liberty Sav., 695 F.2d 1086, 1093 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J., dissenting).
293. Id.
294. Fogel, supra note 4, at 435; see also id. at 459 (scrutinizing the problem of inadequate
protection from predatory lenders under federal legislation).
295. See id. at 459-60 (stating that "RESPA... [does] not adequately protect borrowers
against predatory lending" where RESPA does not allow for a private right of action); see also
Skehan, supra note 44, at 790 ("While this area has been the subject of both federal and state
regulation in the past, neither has effectively resulted in the protection of consumers in the
mortgage lending industry.").
296. As an illustrative example, without a private right of action, lenders remain virtually
free to conceal yield spread premiums-and increase interest rates undetected, thereby
"circumventing the intended use of the yield spread premium-to give ... borrower(s) the
option of deferring closing costs." See Fogel, supra note 4, at 459 (citing Predatory Mortgage
Lending, supra note 2, at 1-2 (opening statement of Senator Paul S. Sarbanes, Chairman, S.
Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs)). In addition to forcing borrowers to pay tens
of thousands of dollars in excessive interest, "the resulting higher interest rates often force
borrowers into foreclosure." See id. (illustrating how predatory lenders devastate borrowers
without adequate protection) (citing ELIZABETH RENUART, STOP PREDATORY LENDING: A GUIDE
FOR LEGAL ADVOCATES 26 (Nat'l Consumer Law Ctr. ed., 2002)). For more information on the
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V Conclusion
Implied private rights of action do exist, and Section 10(a) of RESPA falls
within the limited category of cases in which the Supreme Court arguably could
find an implied private right of action. To deny consumers a private right of
action under Section 10(a) not only cuts contrary to Congress's intent in
passing this provision, but renders its language insignificant by practically
annihilating its meaning. As this Note asserts, Congress at the time of
RESPA's enactment intended to create an implied private right of action under
what is now Section 10(a), and the Congress of 1990 adopted the same intent.
Victims of Section 10(a) violations are clearly members of the class for whose
specific benefit Congress enacted the statute, an implied private right of action
is consistent with the underlying purposes of the statute, and this right is not
traditionally relegated to state law. Because all of these factors weigh in favor
of implying a private right of action under Section 10(a), federal courts should
not deny mortgage borrowers this right, even under the stringent doctrine that
controls questions of implied rights of action today. Indeed, with some
mortgage lenders continuing to "bend the law, twist the law, and wink at
violations of the law, 297 the implication of a private right of action under
Section 10(a) of RESPA should be "irresistible.
2 98
definition of a "yield spread premium," see BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1647 (8th ed. 2004),
which defines "yield spread" as "[t]he differences in yield between various securities issues."
297. Thomas S. Monson, In Quest ofAbundant Life, ENSIGN, Mar. 1988, at 2.
298. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916) (stating that the statutory
provision at issue in that case rendered the "inference of a private right [of action] irresistible").
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